China has spent much of the past two months shoring up friendships both near and far. Two rounds of ministerial meetings with regional rivals Japan and South Korea took place in Tokyo and Seoul at the end of March.

And earlier in April, the red carpet was rolled out for the Spanish prime minister, Pedro Sanchez, for his second visit to Beijing in less than seven months. This came shortly before the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, embarked on his first overseas trip of 2025 – a charm offensive to Vietnam, Malaysia and Cambodia.

Central to these diplomatic moves is Donald Trump, whose return to the White House has clearly unsettled the boundaries between friend and foe.

China, Japan and South Korea have historically approached one another with caution. This is a legacy of imperial aggression, unresolved territorial disputes and diverging security alignments with the US.

But the unpredictability of the Trump administration, which has most recently been demonstrated by the imposition of sweeping trade tariffs, seems to be bringing the three countries closer together.

At the ministerial meeting in Tokyo in March, their respective governments agreed to extend the tenure of the secretary-general and deputy secretaries of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat from two years to three. This still relatively unknown international organisation was established in 2011 in an effort to promote cooperation between the three countries.

The decision, while seemingly a minor administrative adjustment, symbolises a growing mutual trust between these nations. China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, has explicitly acknowledged that the extension represents a full endorsement of the organisation’s role. And China has now called on Japan for a coordinated response to US tariffs.

This renewed momentum in regional cooperation set the stage for Xi’s broader diplomatic offensive through south-east Asia, where China sought to reinforce strategic ties and assert its leadership.

China rolled out an elaborate diplomatic programme for Xi’s stop in Vietnam. It aimed to reaffirm ideological ties of “comrades and brothers” and counter Hanoi’s recent deepening relations with Washington.

Following talks with Xi, the general secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam, To Lam, said that his country has always regarded developing relations with China as “a strategic choice and top priority.”

Malaysia, on the other hand, is one of the earliest supporters of Xi’s signature Belt and Road Initiative. It officially joined the BRICS group of emerging economies as a “partner country” in 2025 and currently holds the rotating chairmanship of the ASEAN group of Southeast Asian states. This gives Malaysia a central role in coordinating China’s relations with the bloc.

During Xi’s visit, the Malaysian prime minister, Anwar Ibrahim, made the alignment between the two countries clear. He stated that Malaysia “stands with China” in the face of US threats. Malaysia is one of China’s main trading partners.

Cambodia is also considered one of Beijing’s most loyal partners in Southeast Asia. In May 2024, it even named a road in the capital, Phnom Penh, “Xi Jinping Avenue” to thank China for its contribution to Cambodia’s development.

The authorities pulled out all the stops for Xi’s latest visit. Cambodia’s king, Norodom Sihamoni, personally greeted Xi at the airport in an unprecedented break from protocol. And the two countries elevated their ties to an “all-weather” partnership, a label signalling that their relationship is resilient to external shifts.

Relations with Europe

Sanchez’s April visit to Beijing, meanwhile, marked an important point in relations between China and the EU. Following the ramping up of US tariffs, Xi called for the EU and China to “jointly resist unilateral bullying.” This appears to have resonated in Madrid.

The Spanish delegation carried a message that Washington’s tariff hikes were “neither fair nor just” and had harmed the EU economy. It also said that Europe must “strengthen unity and coordination to safeguard its own interests.”

This message appears to be filtering through wider European circles, with some leaders signalling their interest in stabilising ties with Beijing. Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission, for example, has engaged in “constructive” discussions with Chinese Premier Li Qiang to address potential trade disruptions from US tariffs.

Yet the EU faces an obvious dilemma: whether to engage China as an alternative economic partner or push back against a likely surge in redirected Chinese exports that would threaten European industries and deepen existing political tensions.

Spain, for its part, has its own strategic calculations. Sánchez’s return to China highlights Madrid’s interest in positioning itself as the European leader in renewable energy, with Chinese investment expected to play a central role in this transition.

This helps explain why, when asked about the EU’s tariff policy on China during a press briefing in September 2024, Sanchez remarked that “Europe needs to reconsider this decision.” Spain ultimately chose to abstain in the EU’s vote on imposing tariffs on the Chinese EV industry.

China’s message to the world is clear. It is a stable partner and a defender of free trade. Whether China can persuade the world to trust its leadership amid deepening geopolitical uncertainty remains an open question.

Ming Gao is research scholar of East Asia Studies, Lund University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.