It may seem paradoxical that the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is now deepening its engagement with Russia after publicly reaffirming its commitment to “sovereignty, political independence and territorial integrity” in a communique soon after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Yet ASEAN’s diplomatic posture should be viewed not through the lens of moral idealism but rather strategic realism. For ASEAN and this year’s chair, Malaysia, engagement is not endorsement.
Rather, it is a highly conscious effort to anchor Russia within an evolving regional framework that prizes dialogue over confrontation and sustains a long-standing tradition of hedging and strategic autonomy amid major power rivalries.
Last week’s meeting between Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow—expected to be followed by Putin’s attendance at the East Asia Summit (EAS) in Kuala Lumpur in October 2025—marks a critical moment.
ASEAN was never meant to be a sanctions-driven alliance, nor an adjudicator of great power misconduct. It is a convening architecture—ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3, the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)—that emphasizes inclusion, consensus and continuous dialogue.
It was designed precisely to accommodate rivals, outliers and even belligerents on the assumption that talking is always better than total disengagement. Thus, engaging Russia through ASEAN channels is not a contradiction—it is the essence of ASEAN diplomacy.
Welcoming Moscow to the EAS in Kuala Lumpur is a diplomatic bet that Russia may still be seeking avenues of cooperation over confrontation. It is also a message to the world that ASEAN does not subscribe to bloc politics or enforced isolation as a pathway to peace.
Avoiding a Bipolar Trap
Malaysia and ASEAN envision an Indo-Pacific that is diverse, multipolar and strategically balanced—not one held hostage by zero-sum US-China dynamics. ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) is a clear expression of this intent.
Russia’s involvement, alongside India, Japan, South Korea and Australia, ensures that no single hegemon dominates the regional agenda. This multiplicity is ASEAN’s insurance policy and safeguard against being subsumed by external rivalries.
For this reason, a constructive Russian role in East Asia is not only acceptable—it is essential. It helps ASEAN retain policy flexibility and geopolitical space, allowing it to maneuver without choosing sides in an increasingly polarized world.
Even amid sanctions and international condemnation, Russia remains a relevant economic actor. It is a major exporter of energy, fertilizer and arms. Russian Sukhoi Su-30 fighter jets remain in active service in Malaysia’s air force. Countries such as Vietnam and Indonesia still maintain defense ties with Moscow, recognizing both cost-effectiveness and strategic diversification.
Severing these links in the name of moral absolutism may satisfy some, but it could erode national security and economic resilience across Southeast Asia. For ASEAN, continued technical cooperation with Russia is not about blind dependence—it is about avoiding overreliance on any one country or bloc, especially in defense and energy security.
Russia’s activities in Central Asia, the Arctic and along the Northern Sea Route (NSR) may seem remote, but they matter for ASEAN’s long-term connectivity agenda.
The convergence of Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) signals an emerging transcontinental corridor that could reshape Asia-Europe trade flows, complementing ASEAN’s regional integration ambitions.
Engagement, therefore, offers ASEAN influence—however subtle—over the trajectory of Russian involvement in Eurasian and Arctic dynamics. By including Russia in multilateral dialogues, ASEAN helps steer that engagement toward peaceful integration rather than exclusionary blocs.
Defining Russian test
Putin’s potential visit to Malaysia in October 2025—potentially his first ever—will be closely watched far and wide, including in Washington. Putin’s visit would be more than protocol; it would be a test of whether Russia can conduct diplomacy on ASEAN’s terms, i.e. inclusive, peaceful and future-oriented.
Will Russia remain trapped in historical resentments and revisionist impulses? Or will it see the summit as a moment to reset its engagement with Asia? The ball, diplomatically speaking, is in Moscow’s court.
Malaysia, as the pivotal summit’s host, has an opportunity to send a clear signal. Prime Minister Anwar’s stated personal commitment to justice, multilateralism and civilizational dialogue gives him standing to engage Putin—not as an apologist, but as a moral and strategic interlocutor.
In an era defined by economic fragmentation and great power antagonism, ASEAN’s outreach to Russia is not a betrayal of values—it is a reclaiming of diplomacy’s purpose. To isolate a nuclear power is to risk escalation; to engage it is to seek transformation.
Russia, under the right conditions, could evolve from a source of disruptive conflict to a contributor to regional stability. The 2025 East Asia Summit in Kuala Lumpur will be its opportunity to show that such a transformation is possible.
ASEAN, and especially Malaysia, are offering the table. The question now is: will Russia take the seat and rise to the occasion?
