On February 16, a fortnight before the outbreak of the Iran war, US President Donald Trump publicly acknowledged having a “good conversation” with Chinese President Xi Jinping about a forthcoming US arms package for Taiwan.
This statement came a few weeks after the Chinese president condemned a previous package, demanding that Washington act with “extreme caution” and emphasizing that Taiwan was the key to stable Sino-American relations.
Many have criticized Trump’s remarks as a worrying sign of abandonment of Taipei ahead of a planned visit to China. Their concerns have deepened since Washington and Israel launched a new war on Iran in late February, which could divert US attention away from the Asia-Pacific and deplete its missile interceptors and other advanced weapon systems.
However, Trump’s statement is less alarming than naysayers suggest and could help stabilize cross-Strait relations. Critics argue that his consultation with Xi broke with a non-binding tradition established in 1982 to reassure Taiwan. The concern is that Trump might be making future arms sales to Taiwan contingent on Beijing’s approval.
In reality, Washington’s arms delivery process to Taiwan has always been shaped by other priorities. Some of the decades-old statements that underpin its cross-Strait policy, including its declared goal to “gradually” reduce those packages, badly need updating.
Additionally, many of those military items are selected based on bureaucratic and corporate interests rather than strategic utility.
As for Washington’s upcoming package, Trump has postponed any announcement until after his trip to China and may make small content adjustments to address some of Beijing’s concerns.
Despite the Supreme Court’s recent landmark ruling against Trump’s sweeping tariffs, he will still hold significant leverage over China, including the threat to maintain all of America’s advanced-technology restrictions.
Although Xi is concerned about Trump’s regime change efforts in Iran, especially after his capture of Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro, the success of the upcoming US-China summit is far more important to Beijing.
More broadly, allegations that Washington is on the verge of abandoning Taiwan are exaggerated. As his critics emphasized, Trump mentioned a “G-2” with Beijing and said his administration seeks “a decent peace… that China can also accept and live under.”
By contrast, the US declined Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s request for a quick stop in America, called off bilateral defense talks after Chinese objections and said little about Beijing’s growing provocations around Taiwan.
Yet the Trump administration has labeled China as a “threat,” opposed “any… coercive change” to Taiwan and stated that a Chinese attack would result in “devastating consequences.”
While the administration’s National Security Strategy mentioned Taiwan a record number of times, its National Defense Strategy called for a “strong denial defense along the First Island Chain.”
The Trump administration’s words are not merely rhetoric. American Marines have kept training Taiwanese troops in the US and, more controversially, in Taiwan.
In December, Washington greenlit a record US$11.1 billion package to bolster Taiwan’s asymmetric warfare capabilities, including HIMARS rocket systems, Javelin anti-tank weapons and other advanced systems. Furthermore, the package he recently delayed reportedly totals $13 billion.
More generally, an invasion or blockade of Taiwan would probably have major effects on the US economy.
Nevertheless, a direct US military intervention could be disastrous given Washington’s global overstretch, its defense-industrial deficiencies, its immense logistical disadvantage compared to Beijing, and the shallowness of the Taiwan Strait, which would hinder US submarines.
It’s also important to remember that any US-China conflict over the self-governing island would be a clash between two nuclear-armed powers. Critics probably overestimate the likelihood of a Chinese attack.
Admittedly, Beijing views reunification as “indispensable” for “rejuvenation” and has become increasingly strident. Yet China has repeatedly stated that it would prefer “peaceful unification.”
Beijing, having studied Russia’s disastrous war in Ukraine, understands that an attack could destabilize its own regime. The complexity of amphibious operations, Taiwan’s mountainous terrain and the density of its capital city, Taipei, could doom an invasion and lead to massive bloodshed. Similarly, a blockade would severely impact China’s economy.
Although Chinese leaders are studying Washington’s regime decapitation strategy and the use of advanced military systems in its ongoing war with Iran, that conflict will likely increase Beijing’s understanding of the recklessness of such interventions.
Still, excessive US support for Taiwan could yet provoke a Chinese attack. The Biden era, marked by presidential promises to intervene in Taiwan’s defense, the first official visit by a House Speaker in a quarter of a century and close ties to increasingly assertive Taiwanese leaders, unnecessarily fueled tensions, which only intensified Chinese pressure on Taipei.
The Trump administration should uphold its “strategic ambiguity” in the Taiwan Strait. While it may continue to support Taipei, it should also engage Beijing to seek mutual de-escalation, advance US interests and promote a peaceful resolution to the dispute.
When Trump travels to China in a few weeks, he should remember that, despite its flaws, Washington’s “strategic ambiguity” has helped prevent a catastrophic war and foster decades of economic growth for all parties involved.
Thomas P. Cavanna is non-resident fellow at Defense Priorities and acollaborating academic visitor at Lehigh University. Follow him on LinkedIn and X.
