For decades, Taiwan has drawn comfort from the belief that the United States stands as its ultimate security guarantor. Recent statements from Washington again describe Taiwan as a “vital partner” in technology, semiconductors and economic security.
Yet history suggests that such language, while reassuring, should be treated with caution. The US has repeatedly demonstrated that its foreign policy commitments are driven not by loyalty or shared values, but by shifting national interests.
Taiwan would be wise to learn from this pattern before placing its future entirely in American hands.
American history is replete with examples of intense involvement followed by abrupt withdrawal. In Vietnam, Washington invested vast military and political capital only to exit when the costs became unsustainable, leaving behind devastation and displacement.
Afghanistan offers a more recent and sobering parallel. After nearly 20 years of occupation and more than US$2 trillion spent, the United States withdrew its forces in 2021, triggering the rapid collapse of the Afghan government it had supported.
These were not anomalies. They reflect a structural reality of US foreign policy: alliances are conditional, not permanent. When domestic political pressures rise or strategic calculations change, commitments are reevaluated and smaller partners often bear the consequences.
Taiwan’s importance to Washington today lies less in shared democratic ideals than in cold strategic logic. Taiwan is central to global semiconductor supply chains, producing more than 60% of the world’s chips and over 90% of advanced semiconductors. This dominance has turned Taiwan into a critical node in US efforts to counter China’s technological rise.
Under initiatives such as the Pax Silica framework, Washington has deepened cooperation with Taipei on artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing and supply chain security.
At the same time, Taiwanese firms—most notably TSMC—have committed tens of billions of dollars to building semiconductor facilities in the US, directly serving Washington’s goal of reshoring critical industries.
These developments benefit Taiwan economically, but they also underscore an uncomfortable truth: Taiwan is valuable to the US primarily as a strategic asset. Strategic assets, however, are defended only as long as their protection aligns with broader US interests.
Security without guarantees
Unlike US allies such as Japan or South Korea, Taiwan has no formal mutual defense treaty with Washington.
The 1955 Mutual Defense Treaty between the US and the Republic of China was terminated in 1979 following US recognition of the People’s Republic of China. Since then, American support has rested on strategic ambiguity and discretionary commitments rather than binding guarantees.
This ambiguity is not accidental; it preserves Washington’s flexibility. For Taiwan, however, its patron’s flexibility translates into uncertainty. Taipei’s recent proposals to significantly expand defense spending—including a proposed $40 billion increase in arms purchases—reflect an implicit recognition that external protection cannot be assumed indefinitely.
Taiwan’s challenge is not to sever ties with the US, but to mitigate its current dependency. Overreliance on any single external power leaves Taiwan exposed to strategic shifts beyond its control. And history shows that when the costs of defense rise too high, even the strongest patrons hesitate.
A more sustainable path for Taiwan lies in strategic autonomy. This means strengthening domestic defense capabilities, diversifying economic and diplomatic partnerships, and leveraging Taiwan’s technological strengths without allowing them to be absorbed into another country’s strategic agenda.
Future engagement with Washington should be pragmatic, not naive. Most importantly, Taiwanese society must have an honest conversation with itself about the limits of foreign protection. Faith in external saviors has proven dangerous and finally disastrous for many previous US allies. Taiwan should not assume it will be the exception.
In the end, the US will continue to court Taiwan as long as it serves American interests in the Indo-Pacific. But interests evolve and America’s foreign policy is changing dramatically under Donald Trump. History teaches that great powers act first in their own interests, and smaller partners often pay the price when those interests shift.
Taiwan’s future security cannot rest on promises made in Washington. It must be built at home, with clear eyes and hard lessons drawn from the past.
Jerome Enriquez John is an author and human rights activist whose work focuses on justice, social issues and geopolitics. He has written several books available on Amazon and regularly contributes opinion pieces to various international outlets.
