The Council on Geostrategy has just launched “The ‘special relationship’: preparing Britain and America for a new era“ at a roundtable hosted by the US Embassy in London. This paper focuses on the alliance in a time of immense change and we tasked ourselves with providing an honest, non-emotive read out of the state of the alliance, focusing on converging or diverging interests – and not values. Here are our big three take-aways.

1. We still have many convergences: the US and UK broadly agree that the economic trading order has hurt their economies and led to de-industrialization, but they are unclear as to the future direction. Is a Bretton Woods II needed or a G7/D-10 that creates a group of like-minded economic powers as occurred during the Cold War? Certainly, the US has decided on its trajectory and is moving out on that trajectory, but the UK remains uncertain…

2. We have a long-term divergence in terms of theatre priority, the shift of US focus to the Indo-Pacific has been taking place since 2011, when the Pivot was first announced. The UK should not be surprised. This divergence is, we feel, manageable through the framework that the two theatres are “interconnected” and that what China and Russia each do in those separate theatres impacts both. This is already true in Ukraine and may become true in other areas.

3. We are more concerned about a divergence in threat priority. For many years, the UK has “muddled through” on China and though the Strategic Defense Review, National Security Strategy, and China Audit all point to a shift in approach, there are strong indicators that this government – like those preceding it – is being careful to manage relations with Beijing carefully as it is seen as a driver for growth. The US shift on Moscow is also of concern to London, which is skeptical of an attempt at a “reverse Kissinger” in which the US, to counter China, aligns with Russia.

We have made a series of recommendations for both sides – particularly on defense industrial cooperation where we see great potential. You may download the full report here. The executive summary follows:

Context:

• While historical foundations and ties have helped to reinforce the ‘special relationship’ between the United Kingdom (UK) and United States (US), it was common geopolitical interests which bound the two nations together. Chief among these has been to prevent others from dominating the most industrialised and productive regions of Eurasia.
• As a result, both countries have co-constructed the prevailing international order. Their strength, determination and foresight after the Second World War created alliances and institutions which saw the collapse of the Soviet Union. But the enlargement of that order and the offshoring of manufacturing have empowered adversaries while weakening UK and US strategic industries.
• Geopolitical changes, especially growing Russian and Chinese aggression, as well as political and strategic changes in Britain and America, have led to fresh questions being asked about the future of the special relationship.

Questions this report addresses:

• What were the fundamental interests which brought the UK and US together, and do they remain cogent?
• How can the two reinforce convergent interests while simultaneously managing divergent interests?
• How can policymakers within the two countries redefine the alliance for a new era of geopolitics and revision of the international order?

Key findings:

• In the 2020s, areas of converging interests include:
  • Accepting limits on globalization: This convergence is currently implicit rather than explicit, though both countries recognise the need to rectify the negative impacts which globalisation has had on their own economies and societies.
  • Rising to the geopolitical challenge: Both countries express aspirations of leadership and have shown the will to address systemic challenges, although to differing degrees in their respective theatres.
  • Rebuilding the defense industrial base: Both nations have identified an urgent need to rebuild production capacity and invest in future technologies.
• Areas of diverging interests include:
  • Theater priority: For the first time in decades, there is a strong possibility that the UK and US will prioritise different regions, with Britain focused primarily on the Euro-Atlantic and America on the Indo-Pacific, though both also retain an interest in the Middle East.
  • Threat precedence: The UK’s stance towards the People’s Republic of China (PRC) frustrates Washington, while London worries about a softer US approach towards Russia.
  • Cooperation preference: The two countries are somewhat divided on their approach to multilateral institutions, including on climate change and trade arrangements.
• These areas of divergence notwithstanding, Britain and America have made similar diagnoses of the geopolitical problems they face, even if they are starting to focus on them from different directions. The two nations also share clarity of purpose in many areas: they require closer and continued strategic dialogue to realign growing divergences. 
• One problem, particularly for the UK, is that while US power has surged ahead, the UK, like many other allies, has fallen behind. Britain has a special interest in strengthening itself – economically, diplomatically and militarily – otherwise its voice will weaken in Washington.
• However, each country is likely to remain the other’s most powerful ally well into the 21st century. This necessitates closer cooperation. While the US has other important allies and partners, none of these look set to be more powerful than the UK by the early 2030s, especially if British naval and deterrence capabilities are regenerated.

Recommendations:

To repurpose the special relationship, the UK and US should:

• Create a new vision of the future of the international order: Britain and America largely agree on the damage done to their economies and industrial bases by neoliberal economic policies. But they lack a vision and strategy to respond. To chart a way forward with the support of a wider group of key allies, they should:
  • Review the level of rival co-option occurring in existing geoeconomic organisations in order to create new ones where necessary, to deal with trade abuses and to coordinate sanctions more effectively;
  • Explore ways of establishing a new geoeconomic order, designed to reinforce the prosperity and resilience of free and open countries, which seeks to limit the ability of adversaries to compete at the geoeconomic level;
  • Strengthen the alignments between the UK and US scientific and technological bases to generate collaboration on regulations for emerging technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Quantum technologies, behind which like-minded partners can follow.
• Plan for a modulated multi-theatre posture: There have been signs from American officials that the US will be far less focused on European security. To mitigate the impact of an American reprioritisation away from Britain’s primary theatre, the two governments should:
  • Work together – and within the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) – to create a clear timeline for the move of key US assets from Europe to the Indo-Pacific theatre over the next five to ten years. The aim should be to allow the UK and other allies to replace those assets in an orderly manner, rather than during a geopolitical emergency in the future;
  • Prepare for the UK to provide leadership and enhanced deterrence in Europe;
  • Reinforce UK support for US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) in the Indo-Pacific;
  • Develop strategic dialogues on the most pressing issues to foster alignment on key national priorities;
  • Forge a better understanding of how and where both nations could contribute to a simultaneous multi-front crisis if one were to materialise.
• Coordinate military production: There is consensus in both countries that greater defence industrial capacity is needed to deter and contain aggressors. The realisation that adversaries are now fielding Chinese technologies will help shape priorities. The UK and US should:
  • Commit to spend at least 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defence by 2030, with 3.5% on military capabilities and 1.5% on strategic infrastructure, as per the recommendation of Mark Rutte, Secretary General of NATO;
  • Ensure that there is clear direction and prioritisation for transatlantic defence industrial collaboration;
  • Prioritise rare earth metal supply chain cooperation; continued PRC control over this vital supply chain is simply not sustainable for future UK-US military industrial expansion and operations;
  • Support efforts which contribute to leadership in critical technologies;
  • Build up the production and co-production of munitions at the bilateral, minilateral and multilateral levels;
  • Cooperate more on co-sustainment, particularly to enable British shipyards to support the US Navy.

William Freer is a research fellow in national security at the Council on Geostrategy in London. John Hemmings, PhD, is deputy director (geopolitics) at the Council on Geostrategy. James Rogers is co-founder (research) at the Council on Geostrategy.