The recently announced ceasefire – referred to as an “understanding” by New Delhi – has drawn considerable criticism within India. Many argue that it failed to impose a sufficient cost on Pakistan, particularly when India held a dominant position across multiple domains – land, air, naval, cyber and informational.
Critics saw the move as yet another example of India’s historical tendency to forgo strategic advantages in favor of political or diplomatic expediency. Concerns were also raised over the nature of the agreement, especially its oral format and perceived openness to third-party mediation in what India considers a strictly bilateral issue.
While such critiques are understandable, a more careful examination of the post-Pahalgam attack timeline, patterns of escalation and actions by both militaries reveals a more nuanced and compelling picture.
A deeper analysis of the sequence of events reveals a calibrated Indian response that has redefined both the deterrence equilibrium and the normative boundaries of regional conflict.
First, India’s response adhered to its doctrine of limited war under the nuclear threshold, but the scale and precision of strikes, extending from Karachi to Rawalpindi, marked a departure from previous patterns.
By targeting key military and terrorist infrastructure across Pakistan’s heartland, India expanded the operational bandwidth of conventional force within a nuclear context. This reset the escalatory ladder, tilting it in India’s favor and exposing the limitations of Pakistan’s nuclear posturing.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statement on May 13 – that Operation Sindoor represents a “paradigm shift” in India’s approach – was not a rhetorical flourish. India’s ability to dictate the terms of engagement, maintain escalation dominance, and avoid international backlash represents a substantive change in regional deterrence dynamics.
Second, the most notable development was India’s targeting of Pakistan’s presumed nuclear infrastructure, including the Kirana Hills and Noor Khan Airbase. These strikes, unprecedented between two nuclear states, directly challenged the long-held notion that nuclear capabilities would shield Pakistan from kinetic retaliation.
New Delhi has, in effect, called Islamabad’s nuclear bluff – sending a signal that nuclear weapons are no longer a carte blanche for proxy warfare or cross-border terrorism.
Third, India has successfully institutionalized the new normal. Since the surgical strikes in 2016 and the Balakot air strikes in 2019, India has consistently moved toward a policy of prompt military retaliation for major terrorist provocations.
Operation Sindoor further institutionalized this “new normal.” The targeted bombing of Jaish-e-Mohammad’s headquarters in Bahawalpur and the Lashkar-e-Taiba base in Muridke, combined with the elimination of UN-sanctioned terrorists, reaffirmed India’s zero-tolerance approach to cross-border terrorism.
Pakistan’s inability to deter this response or to retaliate proportionally underscores a shifting deterrent equation. The message is clear: India will no longer be restrained by past doctrines of strategic restraint.
Fourth, unlike previous episodes of conflict, India also ensured dominance in the information domain. It did not allow the Pakistan Army to get away with an off-ramp. Timely, evidence-based briefings from Indian authorities helped counter Pakistani disinformation.
A particularly symbolic moment came with Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Adampur airbase, where an intact S-400 system was prominently displayed – debunking Pakistani claims of its destruction and reinforcing Indian credibility both domestically and internationally.
This strategic narrative management has helped consolidate public support while shaping international perceptions, marking a maturation in India’s strategic communications.
Fifth, India’s decision to avoid strikes in Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, regions which are already plagued by internal dissent, could be a calculated act of restraint. This denied Pakistan the opportunity to unify its restive peripheries around a nationalist cause and kept the conflict limited to strategic and symbolic targets.
Simultaneously, India restored access to Baloch voices on social media platforms, giving visibility to indigenous resistance movements and subtly challenging Pakistan’s internal cohesion.
Sixth, in what could be seen as an official doctrinal shift, Prime Minister Modi’s May 13 speech firmly delinked future engagement with Pakistan from the issue of Kashmir, except in terms of terrorism and the return of Pakistan-occupied territory.
This builds on the 2019 abrogation of Article 370, which had already complicated Pakistan’s ability to internationalize the Kashmir issue. The new formulation makes it harder for Islamabad to revive global interest in a bilateral dispute that India now frames primarily in terms of security and territorial integrity.
Finally, the most significant long-term development was New Delhi’s decision to hold the Indus Waters Treaty in “abeyance.” Despite being a cornerstone of India-Pakistan hydro-diplomacy since 1960, the treaty has increasingly constrained India’s ability to respond asymmetrically.
By suspending its obligations without provoking international censure, India has introduced a new tool of leverage, particularly relevant as Pakistan’s water crisis deepens. This is not just a strategic maneuver but a paradigmatic assertion of India’s upper riparian rights. It suggests a new willingness to use geo-economic pressure as part of a broader strategic toolkit.
Operation Sindoor marks a watershed moment in India’s national security strategy. It combined kinetic precision with narrative control and diplomatic calibration, fundamentally shifting the deterrence landscape in South Asia. For the first time in decades, Pakistan finds itself without a viable off-ramp, facing sustained pressure on military, political, and economic fronts.
However, while tactical successes are important, they must serve long-term strategic objectives. India’s challenge now is to consolidate these gains without slipping into strategic complacency.
The focus must move from merely deterring Pakistan’s provocations to systematically dismantling the conditions – ideological, institutional, and structural – that enable its continued hostility. Sustained efforts must be made towards its further disintegration to create better conditions of peace in the region in the future.
As Clausewitz reminds us, war is politics by other means. India’s task, therefore, is not just to win battles but to reshape the strategic imagination of the region.
Jyotishman Bhagawati is a Senior Research Fellow in the Academy of International Studies, Jamia Millia Islamia. He can be reached at bhagawati.jeevan@gmail.com.
