The US Air Force has revealed the first image of its next-generation nuclear cruise missile, signaling a significant step in modernizing the aging air-based leg of America’s nuclear triad.

This month, Air & Space Forces Magazine reported that the Air Force has publicly released the first conceptual image of the AGM-181 Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) missile, a stealthy nuclear cruise missile under development by Raytheon via the US Department of Defense’s (DOD) Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS).

Designed to succeed the AGM-86B  Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM), the LRSO will serve as the B-52J’s primary nuclear strike asset by 2030. The Air Force carefully curated the image to obscure key stealth features, depicting an air-breathing missile with anhedral wings, a ventral stabilizer, and possibly a top-side exhaust, resembling the AGM-158 JASSM. The absence of a visible air intake suggests strategic concealment to preserve low observability.

Awarded an initial US$2 billion engineering and manufacturing development contract in 2021, the program is slated for low-rate production starting in February 2027. Budget documents indicate a significant increase in funding from $295.5 million in FY2026 to $1.22 billion in FY2027, with a planned purchase of 1,087 units at approximately $14 million each.

Armed with the W80-4 warhead and capable of subsonic speeds, the LRSO passed its critical design review in 2023. General Thomas Bussiere, commander of Global Strike Command, affirmed the program’s trajectory and noted its operational relevance, even after the B-52’s retirement, hinting at future standoff-capable platforms.

Underscoring the urgency of developing the LRSO, Patty Jane-Geller notes in a January 2021 Heritage Foundation article that the AGM-86B ALCM entered service in 1982 with an intended lifespan of 10 years but has undergone life extension programs to last until 2030.

Jane-Geller explains that advancements in Russian and Chinese air defenses degrade the AGM-86B’s ability to penetrate defended airspace and that life extension programs cannot keep pace with the increasing numbers of defects found in the missiles over time.

Dennis Evans and Jonathan Schwalbe note in a 2017 report for the Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory (APL) that the small number of nuclear-capable US strategic bombers in operation may enable a limited nuclear strike against a lesser adversary but could prove inadequate in a conflict with a nuclear-armed great power.

In line with this, Keith Payne and Mark Schneider explain in an article published this month for the National Institute of Public Policy that, with the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) set to expire in February 2026, the US could increase its nuclear-armed ALCMs from 528 to between 716 and 784 bomber-delivered warheads.

Payne and Schneider argue that expanding the ALCM fleet won’t be feasible until the LRSO becomes operational in the 2030s. By that point, they say the US may only have a limited number of nuclear-capable B-21 bombers, each expected to carry around eight nuclear bombs.

They also note that due to the limited number of B-2s and the recent entry into low-rate production of the B-21, the B-52 will continue to be the primary component of the US air-based nuclear arsenal.

However, they point out that the B-52’s non-stealth configuration makes it dependent on ALCMs for survivability and that the legacy AGM-86B was not designed to penetrate sophisticated air defense systems in the 2020s or beyond.

However, cost concerns may hinder the US’s attempts to modernize its air-based nuclear arsenal. A March 2025 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report notes that the US Air Force may need up to 200 B-21s, with the aging US bomber fleet providing a rationale for increased purchases from an initial 100 planned units.

Despite that, the report notes that US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has reportedly asked the military services to propose an 8% reduction in their planned FY2026 budgets, with nuclear modernization exempt from those budget cuts.

Additionally, the report states that placing US strategic bombers on constant alert may increase demands on costs and manpower, potentially biting into an already constrained budget.

Critically, the report highlights the need for US airbase hardening in the Pacific, noting that hardening with reinforced shelters and passive defenses, such as fleet dispersion, camouflage, and concealment, is necessary to enhance protection against a surprise missile attack.

Reports from Stimson and the Hudson Institute have highlighted the vulnerability of US airbases and aircraft on the ground, with US airbases in Japan, the Philippines, Guam, and the Northern Mariana Islands being within range of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles, with some estimates saying as few as 10 missiles could crater runways, preventing US aircraft from taking off.

That vulnerability is also compounded by a lack of US airbase hardening, with the lack of hardened aircraft shelters (HAS) in most locations, which means that most US aircraft losses in a US-China conflict over Taiwan would happen on the ground.

Furthermore, the US’s deficient missile defenses on key installations, such as Guam, could prove to be a vulnerability.

Robert Peters notes in a January 2024 Heritage Foundation report that Guam needs a full-spectrum, permanent, 360-degree missile defense capability, but US DOD efforts to implement such have moved too slowly, while China is investing enormous sums in developing capabilities that could put US and allied bases at risk with conventional and nuclear weapons.

While the US has the resources to harden and fortify critical airfields, such a move could complicate strategic stability calculations.

In the wake of the audacious Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian airfields, which took out several of the latter’s strategic bombers, pro-Russian defense outlet Top War notes that New START requires the US and Russian strategic bombers to be parked out in the open to be subject to satellite monitoring and inspection-based verification to prevent misperception between the two nuclear powers.

Top War notes that while Russia suspended its participation in New START in February 2023, it continues to de facto abide by its provisions.

In line with that logic, Tong Zhao explains in a July 2024 report for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that non-nuclear US strategic actions, particularly those aimed at improving survivability or enabling conventional precision strikes, may still be interpreted by Chinese analysts as aggressive or escalatory, especially when viewed through the lens of China’s “worst-case thinking” and fear of a disarming first strike.

Such a move could lower China’s nuclear use threshold, with Zhao emphasizing that even defensive or non-nuclear US moves may be viewed by China as escalatory or hostile if not well-communicated, contributing to nuclear instability.