Defying expectations, the United States and China have announced an important agreement to de-escalate bilateral trade tensions after talks in Geneva, Switzerland. Here are the good, the bad and the ugly:
The good news is their recent tariff increases will be slashed. The US has cut tariffs on Chinese imports from 145% to 30%, while China has reduced levies on US imports from 125% to 10%. This greatly eases major bilateral trade tensions, and explains why financial markets rallied.
The bad news is twofold. First, the remaining tariffs are still high by modern standards. The US average trade-weighted tariff rate was 2.2% on January 1 2025, while it is now estimated to be up to 17.8%. This makes it the highest tariff wall since the 1930s.
Overall, it is very likely a new baseline has been set. Bilateral tariff-free trade belongs to a bygone era.

Second, these tariff reductions will be in place for 90 days, while negotiations continue. Talks will likely include a long list of difficult-to-resolve issues. Chinaās currency management policy and industrial subsidies system dominated by state-owned enterprises will be on the table. So will the many non-tariff barriers Beijing can turn on and off like a tap.
China is offering to purchase unspecified quantities of US goods ā in a repeat of a US-China āphase 1 dealā from Trumpās first presidency that was not implemented. On his first day in office in January, amid a blizzard of executive orders, Trump ordered a review of that dealās implementation. The review found China didnāt follow through on the agriculture, finance and intellectual property protection commitments it had made.
Unless the US has now decided to capitulate to Beijingās retaliatory actions, it is difficult to see the US being duped again.
Failure to agree on these points would reveal the ugly truth that both countries continue to impose bilateral export controls on goods deemed sensitive, such as semiconductors (from the US to China) and processed critical minerals (from China to the US).

Moreover, in its so-called āreciprocalā negotiations with other countries, the US is pressing trading partners to cut certain sensitive China-sourced goods from their exports destined for US markets. China is deeply unhappy about these US demands and has threatened to retaliate against trading partners that adopt them.
A temporary truce
Overall, the announcement is best viewed as a truce that does not shift the underlying structural reality that the US and China are locked into a long-term cycle of escalating strategic competition.
That cycle will have its ups (the latest announcement) and downs (the tariff wars that preceded it). For now, both sides have agreed to announce victory and focus on other matters.
For the US, this means ensuring there will be consumer goods on the shelves in time for Halloween and Christmas, albeit at inflated prices. For China, it means restoring some export market access to take pressure off its increasingly ailing economy.
As neither side can vanquish the other, the likely long-term result is a frozen conflict. This will be punctuated by attempts to achieve āescalation dominance,ā as that will determine who emerges with better terms. Observersā opinions on where the balance currently lies are divided.
Along the way, and to use a quote widely attributed to Winston Churchill, to ājaw-jaw is better than to war-war.ā Fasten your seatbelts, there is more turbulence to come.
Where does this leave the rest of us?
Significantly, the US has not (so far) changed its basic goals for all its bilateral trade deals.
Its overarching aim is to cut the goods trade deficit by reducing goods imports and eliminating non-tariff barriers it says are āunfairlyā prohibiting US exports. The US also wants to remove barriers to digital trade and investments by tech giants and āderiskā certain imports that it deems sensitive for national security reasons.
The agreement between the US and UK last week clearly reflects these goals in operation. While the UK received some concessions, the remaining tariffs are higher, at 10% overall, than on April 2 and subject to US-imposed import quotas. Furthermore, the UK must open its market for certain goods while removing China-originating content from steel and pharmaceutical products destined for the US.
For Washingtonās Pacific defense treaty allies, including Australia, nothing has changed. Potentially difficult negotiations with the Trump administration lie ahead, particularly if the US decides to use our security dependencies as leverage to wring concessions in trade. Japan has already disavowed linking security and trade, and progress there should be closely watched.
The US has previously paused high tariffs on manufacturing nations in South-East Asia, particularly those used by other nations as export platforms to avoid China tariffs. Vietnam, Cambodia and others will face sustained uncertainty and increasingly difficult balancing acts. The economic stakes are higher for them.
They, like the Japanese, are long-practiced in the subtle arts of balancing the two giants. Still, juggling ties with both Washington and Beijing will become the act of a higher-and-higher-wire trapeze artist.
Peter Draper is a professor and the executive director of the Institute for International Trade, and the Jean Monnet chair of trade and environment at the University of Adelaide. Nathan Howard Gray is a senior research fellow of the Institute for International Trade, University of Adelaide.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.