The April 2025 India-Pakistan air clashes were not just an air battle, but a masterclass in system-of-systems airpower—showing that in modern warfare, it’s the network, not the jet, that wins, and Southeast Asia’s mixed-fleet air forces should be paying close attention.
At the tactical level, the South China Morning Post (SCMP) reported that Pakistan used an “ABC system”—ground-based radars (A), fighter aircraft (B), and airborne warning systems (C)—to coordinate the detection and engagement of Indian aircraft, with J-10C fighters firing long-range missiles guided by Saab 2000 Erieye airborne early warning & control (AEW&C) planes.
SCMP highlighted that this real-time data sharing among sensors, missile launchers, and battle managers marks a notable departure from traditional air combat, where individual jets managed detection and engagement separately.
As to what ties this system together, Gaston Dubois mentions in an Aviacionline article that Pakistan’s domestic Link-17 enabled the interconnection of combat platforms from diverse origins into a unified and coherent tactical network.
Dubois says that this network-centric design enables the creation of a real-time operational overview, supports dynamic target allocation, and provides an advantage in decision-making against opponents who have disjointed information streams or inadequate system compatibility.
He observes that while India has deployed over 70 aircraft, Pakistan has only 40; however, Pakistan optimized its combat effectiveness through an integrated system of sensors and data connections, allowing it to achieve informational dominance and shared situational awareness to leverage the capabilities of the PL-15E missile fully.
This feat required Pakistan to execute a relatively complex kill chain, involving the detection, tracking, and engagement of targets, with evident success, says Fabian Hoffman in an article for The Spectator.
Hoffman’s observation highlights that Pakistan’s edge in air combat came from the speed and cohesion of its decision-making network rather than just superior hardware or numbers.
In an article for The China Academy, Wang Xiangsui and Charriot Zhai state that Pakistan’s advantage lies in the simplification of its fighter aircraft fleet, comprising only six types and sourcing all fighter acquisitions from China since 2000.
Conversely, they highlight that India operates fourteen types of fighters from five different nations, which significantly increases the complexity involved in integrating data links. Although the Indian Air Force (IAF) does not lag in the level of individual fighter designs, their Western and Russian avionics and missile technologies are incompatible.
Consequently, Wang and Zhai mention that the fighters from France and Russia in India’s arsenal occasionally struggle to communicate with one another and couldn’t guide each other’s missiles. This lack of interoperability exposes a downside of having a diverse range of platforms, which was once considered advantageous but now undermines the efficiency of networked combat.
These operational lessons from the recent India-Pakistan air skirmishes reinforce the idea of operationalizing airpower as an ecosystem, rather than relying on individual platforms.
In a June 2019 article for The Mitchell Forum, Peter Mattes mentions that an integrated air defense system (IADS) is composed of interdependent but diverse elements such as radars, command systems, communications networks, weapon platforms, and personnel, organized to perform surveillance, battle management, and weapons control.
Mattes says that rather than acting independently, these components operate in a fused, parallel network enabled by modern communications and data fusion. He notes that fighter aircraft are not standalone assets but serve within this system to provide defensive counter-air capabilities, complementing surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and electronic warfare systems.
He adds that their role is integrated alongside other elements to ensure layered, adaptive, and seamless air defense across domains.
While Southeast Asian air forces have not yet operated within high-intensity system-of-systems environments, their procurement and planning decisions suggest they may be vulnerable to the same disjointed architectures that hindered India’s airpower effectiveness during the Kashmir clash.
In February 2025, Defense and Security Monitor (DSM) reported that Vietnam may be facing a significant challenge in replacing its Soviet-era Su-22 jets, as the Ukraine War has cast doubt on Russia’s reliability as a supplier, and the performance of its aircraft leaves much to be desired.
While Vietnam has reached an agreement with the US to buy 24 F-16 fighters, introducing the type into the Vietnam People’s Air Force (VPAF), which is built around Soviet and Russian aircraft, will require new training, maintenance, and logistics structures. These adjustments may result in serious interoperability problems.
Maria Siow mentions in an April 2025 SCMP article that Vietnam’s decision to purchase US F-16s was driven by the desire to gain leverage in trade talks with the US, rather than a strategic realignment away from Russia.
Siow says that prior to 2022, Russia supplied 80% of Vietnam’s armaments, and that while Vietnam is working to diversify its suppliers, the Vietnamese military continues to trust Russia more than the US. She notes it is unclear whether Vietnam will receive brand-new or second-hand F-16s, the latter being of questionable combat value against China’s stealth fighters.
She adds that the jets’ high cost, the risk of a hostile Chinese response, and the appeal of lower-profile alternatives such as C-130 cargo planes all weigh against the deal. Siow also says that Vietnam has had no difficulties in acquiring Russian spare parts, making the prospect of acquiring F-16s even less likely.
India’s loss of Rafale fighters may have prompted Indonesia to rethink its purchase of 42 jets of that type, in a sale worth USD 8.1 billion. That purchase would add to the hodgepodge nature of its fighter fleet, consisting of F-16s, Su-27s, and Su-30s.
Defending the Indonesian government’s decision to purchase Rafale jets, Dave Laksono mentioned in an SCMP article that even the most capable fighter jets can be shot down or experience technical issues, while acknowledging that Pakistan’s claims to have downed an Indian Rafale provide legitimate and constructive grounds for evaluation.
Further, Chappy Hakim mentions in a Jakarta Post article that Indonesia’s acquisition of Rafale aircraft does not automatically confer air superiority, but also requires a complete network of reconnaissance radars, early warning sensors, tracking systems, and an integrated command-and-control structure. Without this supporting architecture, adding another fighter type may bring diminishing returns.
In the case of Malaysia, Defense News reported in September 2024 that the country is struggling to keep its 18 Su-30 MKM jets flying, and that Western sanctions have affected its ability to purchase spare parts from Russia.
While Olli Suorsa states in a December 2024 Fulcrum article that the country plans to acquire ex-Kuwaiti F/A-18 jets as a stopgap measure, these aircraft represent aging technology and are older than the F/A-18s Malaysia has in service. He adds that having two F/A-18s from different generations could cause incompatibility with spare parts and increase maintenance complexity.
In an age where airpower is defined by systems integration, Southeast Asian countries’ failure to build cohesive air combat networks could turn their fighter fleets into expensive liabilities.
