Japan has unveiled a mobile hypersonic missile system designed to outmaneuver China’s layered carrier defenses and threaten North Korea’s survivable nuclear arsenal, marking a decisive shift from a purely defensive posture to a counterstrike capability.

This month, Asian Military Review reported that at  Fuji Firepower 2025, the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) unveiled the ground-launched Hyper Velocity Guided Projectile (HVGP), a mobile hypersonic strike missile system developed by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries under contract from Japan’s Advanced Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA).

The HVGP program, launched in 2018, marked its first successful test firing in early 2024 at a US range. Its operational deployment has been advanced to 2026. The Block 1 HVGP, mounted on an 8×8 tactical truck with two containerized, solid-fuel boost-glide missiles, has a range of 500–900 km and reaches Mach 5.

Upgraded variants, Block 2A and 2B, are planned for 2027 and 2030, with their ranges extended to 2,000 kilometers and 3,000 kilometers, respectively. The HVGP employs satellite and inertial navigation, with a naval-targeting variant using RF imaging derived from Doppler shift and a land-attack version deploying explosively formed projectiles. Both are designed for high-speed maneuvering post-boost.

Planned deployments in Kyushu and Hokkaido underscore its strategic intent to counter regional threats. Concurrently, Japan is also developing the scramjet-powered Hypersonic Cruise Missile (HCV) to extend strike capabilities further. These systems are at the core of Japan’s revised defense strategy, which aims to safeguard its territorial integrity amid increasing regional security pressures.

Previously, Asia Times reported that Japan announced four hypersonic missile tests conducted in California between August 2024 and January 2025. These systems are envisioned for strategic interdiction, counterforce, and even counter-leadership operations.

In line with developing strategic interdiction capabilities, Japan has recently conducted the first domestic test firing of its short-range Type 88 anti-ship missile and plans to develop the long-range Type 12.

However, James Conway and Jerry McAbee mention in a March 2024 RealClearDefense article that by 2030, subsonic cruise missiles and supersonic ballistic missiles may become obsolete against the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN).

Japan’s current arsenal of subsonic cruise and ballistic missiles faces significant limitations: subsonic cruise missiles allow a longer intercept window despite their maneuverability, while ballistic missiles, though fast, follow predictable arcs that are easier to track. These constraints justify Japan’s shift toward maneuverable hypersonic systems, such as the HVGP.

Underscoring this point, Daniel Rice’s December 2024 report for the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) highlights that the PLAN carrier strategy is built around a three-layer defense system, enabling increasingly autonomous and far-reaching blue-water operations.

Rice explains that the carrier battlegroup’s defenses are arranged in concentric zones: the “Outer Defense Zone” (185–400 kilometers), maintained by submarines and J-15 fighters for long-range strikes and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); the “Middle Defense Zone” (45–185 kilometers), secured by destroyers and frigates equipped with radar, vertical launch systems (VLS), and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities; and the “Inner Defense Zone” (100 meters–45 kilometers), protected by close-in weapons and point-defense systems.

Aside from strategic interdiction, Japan’s hypersonic weapons may be poised to play a critical role in its counterstrike capabilities against North Korea’s nuclear arsenal.

In a March 2024 article for the United States Studies Center (USSC), Masashi Murano notes that Japan’s counterstrike capability focuses on long-range, conventional counterforce strikes against military assets, such as missile bases, rather than leadership or cities. To that end, Murano mentions that Japan is acquiring Tomahawk cruise missiles, improved Type 12 missiles, and hypersonic missiles.

However, Murano cautions that Japan still faces deficiencies in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to hit time-sensitive targets such as transporter erector launchers (TEL), its counterstrike doctrine is still a work in progress, and the risks of escalation remain major issues it should tackle in building its counterstrike capabilities.

In addition, North Korea has taken several measures to harden its nuclear arsenal against a pre-emptive counterforce strike.

Hans Kristensen and other writers mention in a July 2024 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that North Korea is actively pursuing solid-fuel rocket intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), sea-based platforms such as nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBN), and tactical nuclear weapons, which together enhance survivability by making its arsenal more mobile, concealable, and less reliant on vulnerable fixed launch sites.

Kristensen and others note that North Korea’s deeply buried enrichment sites, continued fissile production, and development of tactical warheads all point to a doctrine that embraces redundancy and dispersion, hallmarks of a survivable deterrent.

Given that sanctions and threats of military action have failed to dissuade the North Korean regime from continuing its nuclear program and stopping its belligerent behavior, some strategists argue that targeting the regime itself might compel behavioral change.

In an April 2023 NK News commentary, Bruce Bennett notes that the Kim regime’s prioritization of military buildup over basic human needs, along with exhortations to the North Korean public to sacrifice for the country’s defense, reflects deep anxiety over regime survival and control.

Bennett observes that deployments like MQ-9 Reaper drones in Japan, air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) from B-52s flying over the Korean Peninsula, and Japan’s new hypersonic systems may concern the Kim regime over its survival.

Yet, as Lauren Sukin points out in a February 2024 article for the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), North Korea’s nuclear policy calls for automatic nuclear retaliation should its command and control system, including Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un, be attacked.

Sukin adds that the US, and by extension, its allies, forcing regime change on North Korea could end, at best, in an even more anti-US regime than that headed by Kim Jong Un. At worst, she says such attempts could result in regional instability or North Korea using chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons.

Japan’s rollout of hypersonic strike weapons marks a significant moment in Northeast Asian security. While they offer a powerful conventional deterrent against China’s carrier strike groups and North Korea’s dispersed nuclear forces, they also heighten the risk of arms racing, strategic miscalculation, and regional instability.