The answer to that question lies in a failure to grasp the peculiarities of the Venezuelan context, both historical and current. As noted in an earlier post, the opposition’s track record on respect for democracy has been far from stellar. A number of its leaders instigated a military coup (with U.S. support) that ousted Chavez from power in 2002—he was brought back after massive demonstrations in Venezuela and international condemnation. Not surprisingly, therefore, both Chavez and Maduro stacked the military with loyal supporters, dismissing those whose loyalty was suspect. More importantly, however, is the fact that both the Chavez and Maduro regimes afforded the upper echelons of the military and the National Guard opportunities to acquire substantial wealth. Insight Crime has extensively documented the involvement of the top leadership, particularly the National Guard, in drug trafficking. Without a negotiated agreement that provides assurances against criminal prosecution, senior military leaders and the National Guard have an enormously powerful incentive to remain loyal to the regime.

However, there are other reasons, extending beyond the simple fact of military loyalty, to have anticipated the current outcome. It is true, as the mainstream media so frequently noted, that the regime employed repression, jailing opposition leaders and at times employing lethal force against protesters–although the fact that opposition demonstrations continued might suggest that the repression employed was not especially brutal by international standards. It is important to recognize that despite the severe humanitarian crisis, the Maduro regime retains a core of diehard supporters, estimated at about one-fifth of the population, with that support coming largely from among the poor who have suffered the most from the current crisis. This fearless loyalty is understandable. Chavez funneled revenues from the petroleum boom into substantial poverty reduction, something past regimes had not done in any appreciable way. Guaidó’s supporters (particularly the international ones) also erred in their dismissal of demonstrations supporting the regime as weak and mostly state-orchestrated. Support for Chavismo (and by extension for Maduro, Chavez’s anointed successor) arises largely from the concrete material improvement experienced by many Venezuelans during Chavez’s years in power. The complexities of the unsustainability of Chavez poorly conceived neo-extractivist populism has not been part of the opposition’s arsenal of criticisms. Instead, the conflict between government and opposition has descended into an ideological war, between the evils of socialism and the machinations of imperialism. The mainstream media has been particularly inclined to focus on the idea of Venezuela as a dismal socialist failure, while Maduro has effectively played upon popular suspicions of U.S. intentions surrounding Venezuela’s massive hydrocarbon reserves along with popular fears of U.S. military intervention.

The Shortsightedness of the Opposition Strategy