TOKYO — Project Vault represents a structural shift in how the United States will compete for “manufacturing-ready” critical minerals.
Japan’s current Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry–Japan Organization for Metals and Energy Security’s case-by-case approach risks becoming too slow and too small compared with America’s new multi-billion-dollar vehicle.
The Trump administration’s Project Vault creates a US Strategic Critical Minerals Reserve designed to buffer US manufacturers from supply shocks by procuring and storing essential raw materials through an independently governed public-private partnership.
The initiative is backed by a direct US Export-Import Bank loan of up to US$10 billion and nearly $2 billion in private-sector investment, totaling approximately $12 billion. It is being framed as a supply chain security tool rather than a single mining project.
The Export-Import Bank describes the reserve as an independently governed public-private partnership that will store essential raw materials in secure facilities across the US. Unlike a single mine or processing plant, it is meant to function as a portfolio mechanism that can procure, store and manage inventories as risks evolve.
Policy specialists suggest Japan should shift from a reactive, project-by-project posture to a programmatic, critical-minerals facility model with portfolio governance, pre-screened pipelines and fast-track lanes for Tier 1 minerals.
Japan should also upgrade its decision criteria from “percentage of Japan imports secured” to a risk-impact framework that assesses substitutability, time to replace, processing chokepoints, and allied redundancy to prioritize where limited public funding yields the maximum economic security gains.
Japan should treat “deal execution capacity” — including law firms, trading houses and policy finance toolkits — as a strategic asset, because the central constraint is increasingly structure, speed and multi-program eligibility, not just capital.
Project Vault is designed to secure inputs for US industry during shortages, which can tighten availability and raise the “option value” of inventory for US buyers across refined and semi-processed materials.
Japan, highly exposed to import dependence in multiple upstream materials, cannot assume spot markets will remain equally accessible when a US portfolio stockpiler is actively procuring and rotating inventories at scale.
If Japan does not adapt its approach, it risks three major losses. First, a higher probability of allocation risk, with Japan paying more, waiting longer or losing cargoes during disruptions because a reserve mechanism prioritizes continuity for its participants.
Second, a slower response than US and European Union program vehicles, because Japan’s current model is optimized for evaluating individual projects, not actively managing mineral-specific portfolios.
Third, a strategic mismatch in which Japan may fund volume while disruptions increasingly occur at processing and refined-product chokepoints, where short outages can halt downstream manufacturing.
Japan’s METI-JOGMEC system has strong institutions and experience, but its default operating mode remains largely case-by-case. Companies originate projects, then seek public support. The approach is disciplined but structurally slower than that of a pre-approved facility with delegated portfolio procurement authority.
A public-facing upgrade is not about copying Project Vault dollar for dollar but borrowing its operating logic: preannounced priority minerals, pre-screened pipelines, standardized documents and a fast-track lane for Tier 1 inputs that can halt semiconductor, battery and defense supply chains.
The emerging consensus in Tokyo policy circles is that Japan does not need a $10 billion Project Vault clone, but it does need to borrow its logic. A credible Takaichi-era playbook would have several core elements.
First, establish a multiyear Japan Critical Minerals Facility under JOGMEC — a programmatic umbrella that can support a portfolio of projects over five to 10 years, explicitly tied to priority minerals and supply chain vulnerabilities.
Second, pursue proactive origination through annual priority lists for minerals and geographies, with joint METI-JOGMEC-embassy roadshows supported by law firms and trading houses to build a pre-screened global pipeline of candidate projects.
Third, create fast-track lanes for Tier 1 minerals with standardized documentation and tight review timelines for projects that underpin chips, batteries and key defense applications, so Japan has “ready-to-go” options before a crisis hits.
Fourth, implement risk-weighted allocation, replacing informal volume thresholds with tiered, mineral-specific criteria and managing commitments as a diversified portfolio rather than on a first-come, first-served basis. Law firms and sogo shosha would have a different role in this model.
Rather than acting only as traditional advisers or sponsors, they would become policy-driven dealmakers, structuring transactions to qualify for multiple public programs — including JOGMEC, the Japan Bank for International Cooperation, Nippon Export and Investment Insurance, Project Vault, European Union facilities and Gulf investors — while aligning offtake, governance and stockpiling with both security and financial objectives.
Hybrid fee models that reward successful integration of public support could encourage firms to build and maintain their own pipelines of strategic projects rather than waiting passively for clients to ask.
For corporate Japan, Project Vault is not just another American industrial subsidy. It signals that critical minerals are being treated as a quasi-public utility for advanced manufacturing. If Japan responds only with incremental tweaks to existing schemes, it risks paying more for less security in the next supply chain shock.
If, on the other hand, Tokyo leverages Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s political capital to launch a lean, risk-weighted critical minerals facility, empower law firms and trading houses as front-line economic security actors and shift from project-by-project approvals to portfolio thinking, it can punch well above its fiscal weight.
In that scenario, Japan would not try to match American dollars but could still match, or even surpass, American resilience.
Anh Phan is a Vietnam-based policy analyst and dealmaker who works at the intersection of law, capital and industrial strategy, weaving legal structures, transaction design and public policy into practical solutions for complex, nation-shaping challenges.
