The US Air Force proposes to “divest” itself of 162 A-10 Warthog aircraft by 2026 and send them to the boneyard at Davis Monthan Airbase in Tucson, Arizona. There the A-10s would rot away in the sun. If the US Air Force does not want them anymore, they would be gone by the end of 2026 or sooner.

Sending them to the scrap heap would be a massive mistake. Better to send them to Taiwan where they could make a major contribution to defending the island.

Taiwan faces the risk of a massive invasion from China, something the Chinese army, navy and air force have been practicing for years. The US knows the risk of a Chinese invasion, and Washington has accelerated its efforts to pivot to the Pacific.

Planners know that any attack on Taiwan could end US influence in the region and deprive the US of vital assets, including specialized semiconductors needed for the Artificial Intelligence revolution. Companies such as Nvidia, which calls itself the world leader in artificial intelligence computing, relies on Taiwan Semiconductor (TSMC) to manufacture their advanced chips.

No matter how you look at it, Taiwan will have to shoulder the burden of an initial attack by China. The first few days will be critical. Swarms of Chinese invasion craft, supported by missiles and drones, will push Taiwan’s modest defense resources to the breaking point.

Taiwan’s air force consists of modernized, but quite old, F-16s and home-grown short-legged F-CK-1 Ching Kuo fighter jets. A near-fourth generation jet, the F-CK-1 is underpowered and has limited range and endurance. Taiwan’s existing aircraft are unlikely to be able to stop an incoming invasion fleet, or support Taiwanese air defenses by knocking out swarms of drones.

The A-10, however, can do both jobs, and it is more sturdy and survivable than any Taiwan air force jet in the inventory. The A-10 also has superior firepower and is equipped with new weapons ideally suited to sinking an invasion fleet or blasting away at drones.

The A-10 is a creature of the 1970s. Originally built by the now defunct Fairchild-Republic company between 1972 to 1984 in Farmingdale, New York, the A-10 was conceived as a ground attack plane to knock out Soviet tanks and other armor on the battlefield. Its creators thought of the A-10 playing a big role in stopping a Soviet invasion of then-West Germany through the Fulda Gap, an ideal funnel where Soviet armor could be picked off.

That mission faded away just as the USSR dematerialized. But over the years, and especially in the last half decade, the remaining A-10s have been significantly modified and equipped to carry new weapons that were not yet dreamed about in the 1970s.

Equipped with new, sturdy wings, new electronics and fire control, laser designators, and “smart” rocket pods, the A-10’s upgrades complement the huge firepower of its GAU-8 Avenger 30mm hydraulically driven seven-barrel Gatling-style autocannon. The autocannon fires PGU-14/B armor-piercing incendiary rounds featuring a depleted uranium penetrator that can easily tear up any landing ship or other seagoing vessel.

The new star of the show is the A-10’s ability to fire the new/old 70mm Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II. The APKWS is an old Hydra unguided rocket that is upgraded with a guidance kit that is operated with a laser designator to hit a target. APKWS recently were diverted to the Middle East from Ukraine because they proved valuable in shooting down Houthi drones. The APKWS II system is highly effective but cheap compared with using air-to-air missiles to knock out drones.

The cost of a Sidewinder AIM-9X missile is around $600,000; typically two are fired at a target to nail it. The all up cost of the APKWS including the unguided Hydra unguided rocket (which are about $3,000 each) is less than $25,000. Because it is a man-in-the-loop guidance package – unlike the Sidewinder, which uses an infrared seeker – the chance for a successful hit is better. Sidewinder has far better range, but most of the time small drones are not picked up by radar or E/O sensors until they are much nearer.

The range of the APKWS is around two miles. Most drones cannot fight back, so knocking them out of the sky is a turkey shoot.

If Taiwan had the full fleet of A-10s it could focus its air defenses against Chinese missiles and let the A-10s operate against drones.

Compared with modern jet fighters the cost of operating the A-10 is far lower, coming in at $6,000 to $9,000 per hour compared versus the F-16’s $30,000 per hour.

A-10 aircraft are made to be robust, including titanium armor to protect the cockpit and self-sealing fuel tanks if the plane is hit by ground fire.

The upgraded A-10s also has a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) which means it can see targets even in bad weather. This means that if the PLA Navy tries to launch an invasion in heavy overcast conditions, thinking it can preclude Taiwan’s use of airpower, the SAR upgrade takes that strategy off the table because SAR can see through clouds, mist and bad weather.

In the past Taiwan has always wanted the newest and the greatest, not old stuff that the US has often dumped on the island. That view is understandable, but the A-10 must be viewed as a formidable exception. The A-10 would hand to Taiwan a capability it sorely lacks, and one that China will fear. With F-16s challenging China’s air arm, the A-10 can sink an invasion fleet and do so quickly.

In the past the US has refused to export the A-10, a strange posture considering that the Air Force has a low opinion of the fighter. But the potential struggle over Taiwan is looming. Taiwanese air crews could quickly be trained here by the existing operators, and support and maintenance assets rapidly transferred to the island.

Any new equipment, if we had any, will take years to materialize and probably can’t duplicate the flexibility and utility of the A-10. So, if the Air Force does not want the A-10, the A-10 can still contribute to Taiwan’s defense and to security in the Pacific region.

Stephen Bryen is a special correspondent to Asia Times and former US deputy undersecretary of defense for policy. This article, which originally appeared on his Substack newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.