The B-52’s radar upgrade has exceeded cost projections, triggering a Nunn-McCurdy breach and reigniting debate over whether modernizing the Cold War era bomber is still viable.
The B-52 Radar Modernization Program (RMP)—a key step in converting the B-52H to the B-52J—has overrun its budget by 17%, surpassing the 15% threshold that mandates congressional review, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine.
The upgrade, led by US defense contractor Raytheon via aerospace giant Boeing, replaces the aging AN/APQ-166 with a new active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, designated AN/APQ-188, a hybrid system based on radars used in the F-15 and F/A-18.
A deviation report on the budget overrun was filed in April, with formal notification expected soon.
Despite cost concerns, US Air Force acquisition officials are reportedly confident the program can proceed, refining requirements to ensure affordability while preserving critical capabilities.
The first operational radar units are slated for 2027, with full integration dependent on budgetary feasibility. US Department of Defense (DOD) reports indicate technical requirements are being met, though concerns remain about radome shaping effects.
Low-rate production decisions covering 28 aircraft are expected in 2026, with broader deployment following operational testing by 2028. The program’s cost estimate has risen from US$2.3 billion to $2.6 billion.
The US Air Force may have foreshadowed this Nunn-McCurdy notification by looking at alternatives to the AN/APQ-166, as The War Zone (TWZ) reported in March 2025.
TWZ notes that the US Air Force’s contracting notice raises questions about the RMP program’s future, although it mentions that there are no intended changes and that the service may want to know its options before pushing through with the upgrade.
Looking at the rationale behind the B-52 radar upgrade, the 2024 B-52 RMP report by the US Office of the Director, Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) mentions that the AN/APQ-188 will improve system reliability and reduce sustainment costs, while offering new high-resolution ground-mapping to improve target location accuracy and tracking of moving targets.
At the tactical level, the report says these new capabilities would allow the B-52J to perform long-range, all-weather conventional and nuclear strike operations using a variety of munitions against ground and maritime targets in a low to medium threat environment.
It adds that B-52J theater-level tasks include strategic attack, time-sensitive targeting, air interdiction, close air support (CAS), suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), minelaying and nuclear deterrence.
Looking at the B-52J’s possible operational employment, Kris Osborn mentions in a March 2025 article for 1945 that the B-52 can function as an “arsenal plane,” launching long-range cruise missiles, precision-guided bombs, and nuclear weapons from standoff distances.
Moreover, Osborn says the B-52 can become a drone “mothership,” launching drones to perform intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), targeting, or even attack missions.
Still, not everyone is convinced. Andrew Latham argues in a 1945 article that despite those upgrades, the B-52J is no longer survivable against near-peer adversaries, stating that while it can operate at standoff distances launching cruise missiles, it will never again operate safely in heavily defended airspace.
Latham adds that aging B-52s have become more expensive to maintain, noting that the US Air Force already struggles to keep its B-1s and B-2s in service. He notes that every dollar spent on modernizing the B-52 diverts resources from the B-21 program.
He argues that even with standoff capabilities, non-stealthy bombers like the B-52 will become increasingly vulnerable as adversaries advance in hypersonic weapons, integrated air defense systems (IADS) and electronic warfare.
The US bomber fleet’s mission-capable rates also raise concerns about current readiness and the urgency of modernization.
As of 2024, the 72-strong B-52 fleet had a Mission Capable (MC) rating of 53.77%—relatively low, but still better than the B-1 fleet at 43.44% and the B-2 fleet at 55.04%, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine.
However, modernization efforts face long-term delays. A June 2024 GAO report notes that while the B-52 RMP aims for initial operating capability (IOC) by 2027, delays in the Commercial Engine Replacement Program (CERP) have pushed IOC for the upgraded B-52J to 2033.
At the strategic level, the B-52 remains a critical asset in US Air Force Bomber Task Force (BTF) missions, which are regular and routine deployments of bombers to reassure allies and deter adversaries.
The strategy leverages bombers’ recallability, in which sending them toward a target signals resolve without triggering nuclear escalation.
In the Pacific, Newsweek mentioned in April 2025 that the US operates B-1 bombers from Misawa Air Base in Japan, B-1s from Guam, B-52s from Naval Support Facility (NSF) Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, and B-2s from Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Base Amberley in Australia and Joint Base Pearl Harbor-Hickham in Hawaii.
However, there is a risk that using nuclear-capable bombers such as the B-52 in a conventional standoff strike role could trigger nuclear escalation.
A November 2024 RAND report by Dahlia Goldfeld and others warns that long-range bombers like the B-52 could unintentionally provoke Chinese nuclear escalation in a Taiwan conflict.
They argue that the bombers’ high visibility, their deployment of dual-capable payloads such as air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and historical patterns of US bomber use—such as high-tempo sorties during the 2003 Iraq invasion—could be interpreted by China as preparation for a decapitation or regime-change campaign.
Goldfeld and others further note that when combined with deception tactics and the potential for false alarms, these signals may create the illusion of an imminent nuclear strike, prompting a preemptive Chinese response regardless of US intent.
Whether the B-52J becomes a cost-effective force multiplier or an aging liability will depend not just on radar integration and budget control, but on how adversaries interpret its return to prominence in a more dangerous strategic environment.
