China’s accelerating nuclear submarine buildup is no longer just a shipyard story, but a strategic test of whether faster production can be converted into real leverage against US sea power in the Pacific.
This month, the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) released a report stating that China has sharply accelerated nuclear-powered submarine production over the past five years, overtaking the US in annual launches for the first time as China expands the Bohai Shipbuilding Heavy Industry Co. yard in Huludao and fields more submarines to bolster its emerging nuclear triad.
The report says China launched more submarines in 2021–25 than in the entire previous decade, including what are assessed to be the seventh and eighth Type-094 Jin-class nuclear ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs), identified through commercial satellite imagery at Huludao and operational bases, alongside a growing run of Type-093B Shang III nuclear attack submarines (SSN) fitted for vertical launch systems (VLS).
Imagery and US assessments suggest up to nine Type-093B hulls have been launched since 2022, implying a production tempo of roughly two per year, and a new, larger SSN was seen launching this month, likely the first of a new class.
The expansion follows the construction of a second production hall between 2019 and 2022 and has enabled China to reach a “1+2” output rhythm comparable to US plans, though IISS notes that US submarines remain larger and more complex.
Despite lingering concerns over Chinese submarine noise and survivability that confine SSBN patrols largely to the South China Sea, China is extending its reach by introducing the longer-range JL-3 missile and is expected to begin producing the next-generation Type-096 later this decade, underscoring a strategic push to strengthen sea-based nuclear deterrence and challenge US undersea dominance.
Statista data from January 2026 shows the US maintains the world’s largest nuclear submarine fleet at 71 units, while China, at 32, remains a distant second—but is slowly gaining in production rates.
A January 2026 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report says the US Navy has procured 41 Virginia-class SSNs through FY2025, but, despite a plan to buy two per year from FY2011–FY2024, actual output has lagged at about 1.1–1.2 submarines annually since 2022, creating a backlog of funded but unbuilt hulls.
CRS notes the FY2026 budget again seeks two boats, with goals of 2.0 and then 2.33 per year for AUKUS, though timelines remain uncertain. Separately, a December 2025 CRS report says the 12-boat Columbia-class SSBN program averaged 0.4 per year in FY2021–FY2025 and plans to shift to one per year from FY2026–FY2035, despite a roughly 17-month delay to the lead boat.
Considering those numbers, China’s higher annual throughput means its undersea fleet grows faster simply by accumulation, even if each unit is less capable. The US, building more slowly and juggling two major submarine programs at once, first has to prevent its relative numbers from slipping further before it can even start to close the gap.
Because submarines stay in service for decades, every year of faster Chinese output compounds into a long-term numerical advantage. Even if US production later improves, today’s shortfalls will still echo in fleet size, deployment availability, and surge capacity for years.
Beyond the numbers, China’s nuclear-powered submarine fleet enables it to conduct power projection without the range and endurance constraints of conventionally powered submarines.
For instance, US naval power is built around its nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. With just 11 carriers deployed on a global scale, the US could not afford to lose even a single one in combat. While China has developed “carrier-killer” anti-ship ballistic missiles such as the DF-21D and DF-26B, the complex kill chain required to find, fix, track, target, engage, and assess damage introduces multiple vulnerabilities and potential points of failure.
Therefore, China’s SSNs, alongside its anti-ship ballistic missile fleet, could be among its most potent assets against US aircraft carriers. As US aircraft carriers are forced to operate farther from China’s coasts to avoid the anti-ship ballistic missile threat, China’s SSNs may have the capabilities to stay on station longer and farther out into the Pacific to hold US carriers at risk, thereby increasing the costs of US intervention in a Taiwan scenario.
Alternatively, China’s SSNs may be tasked with escorting its carrier strike groups (CSGs) as they operate farther out into the Pacific. As China’s CSGs increasingly operate beyond the First Island Chain, SSNs could be tasked to protect the formation against undersea threats, such as US and allied submarines tasked to sink China’s carriers.
Beyond threatening US carriers and escorting China’s carriers, China’s SSNs could be deployed to threaten US Pacific bases beyond the First Island Chain, such as Guam, Tinian, Saipan, Wake Island, Hawaii, and facilities in Australia and New Zealand.
According to the US Army’s ODIN database, the Type-093B Shang III SSN may be armed with the CJ-10 land-attack cruise missile (LACM) with a 2,000-kilometer range, enabling it to threaten critical locations located far away from China’s shores.
Because China has a limited number of SSBNs, and because the Bohai, Yellow, and East China seas are shallow and relatively small, China has relied on a bastion strategy in the South China Sea.
This bastion is heavily protected by air, surface, and submarine forces and fortified artificial islands, giving China’s SSBNs a safe location for its underwater nuclear arsenal. More SSBNs could enable China to overlap and surge patrols to maintain an assured second strike capability.
However, it is unclear if more SSBNs alone could enable a shift from a constrained bastion strategy to open-water patrols. Open-water patrols in the Pacific would relieve China of the costs of having to maintain an expensive bastion in the South China Seas, make detection significantly harder, and bring more of the continental US within range of its undersea nuclear arsenal.
Despite the advantages afforded by its nuclear submarines, China is still grappling with fundamental geographic challenges. To reach the open waters of the Pacific, China’s nuclear submarines must cross critical chokepoints in the First Island Chain, such as the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel.
Crossing those sensor-saturated chokepoints requires exceptionally quiet submarines, and it is unclear whether China’s stealth technology and command and control (C2) have evolved to the level required for the task. A mass breakout could instead create predictable “fatal funnels” that concentrate US and allied anti-submarine efforts.
Overall, China’s faster submarine production is steadily shifting the undersea balance by compounding long-term numerical pressure on a slower-moving US industrial base, but whether this translates into real operational and strategic advantage will depend less on hull counts than on China’s ability to break through First Island Chain chokepoints and operate quietly, reliably, and at scale in the wider Pacific.
