China’s rapid push for nuclear parity with the US and Russia is cracking Cold War-era deterrence and igniting a volatile global nuclear arms race with no guardrails.
This month, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reported that China’s nuclear arsenal is undergoing the fastest expansion among all nuclear powers.
The institute states that China’s warhead stockpile rose from 500 to up to 600 between January 2024 and January 2025. It also notes that China is building approximately 350 new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos, some of which are now loaded with missiles.
SIPRI further reports that China is, for the first time, deploying some warheads on missiles during peacetime, while also modernizing sea- and air-based delivery platforms.
SIPRI observes that Russia, meanwhile, has nearly completed a major overhaul of its strategic forces. According to the institute, Russia has deployed the new Sarmat and Yars ICBMs, as well as the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV).
It notes that Russia is expanding its Borei-class ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) fleet and developing innovative systems, such as the Poseidon nuclear torpedo.
The institute also states that the US, while maintaining a steady stockpile, delivered more than 200 modernized nuclear weapons in 2023, its highest annual total since the Cold War.
It notes that the US is pressing ahead with next-generation ICBMs, SSBNs and strategic bombers. Despite a global decline in total warhead numbers, SIPRI stresses this reflects the dismantling of retired warheads, not a de-escalation; it emphasizes that active arsenals are growing due to modernization.
As China closes the gap with the US, Russia flaunts new nuclear systems and US alliances fray under Donald Trump’s transactional politics, the world risks sliding from a fragile tripolar balance into an unstable multipolar arms race with global proliferation consequences.
Deye Li’s 2024 paper for the Project on Nuclear Issues (PONI) warns that tripolarity erodes crisis stability. He writes that, unlike bilateral deterrence, tripolar dynamics foster ambiguity in signaling and increase risks of opportunism, misperceptions and fragile coordination.
The evolving nuclear triangle among the US, China and Russia is characterized by mistrust, strategic opportunism and incompatible threat perceptions, conditions that he warns could easily lead to miscalculation.
Tong Zhao’s July 2024 report for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP) notes that US analysts often see China’s buildup as an effort to match the US as a nuclear peer and potentially create ambiguity about China’s willingness to escalate in a Taiwan crisis.
He writes that China views its nuclear buildup as a necessary response to perceived US hostility, one that it considers essential for the survival of its Communist Party-led regime and for securing international recognition of its status as a great power.
Similarly, Mike Albertson and Nikolai Sokov’s April 2023 report from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) states that the US views Russia’s buildup as a pressure tactic aimed at securing concessions on Ukraine and NATO.
They write that Russia perceives US missile defenses and NATO expansion as existential threats, prompting its nuclear upgrades to maintain parity amid fears of conventional military inferiority.
At the same time, China and Russia, frequently billed as “all-weather friends,” show signs of distrust.
In February 2024, the Financial Times (FT) reported leaked Russian documents revealing rehearsals for tactical nuclear strikes in response to a hypothetical Chinese invasion.
The report states that this reflects fears that China might exploit Russia’s distraction in Ukraine to gain influence in Central Asia. Additionally, Newsweek recently reported that other leaked documents reveal Russia’s concerns about China reclaiming territories in the Russian Far East annexed in the 19th century.
Ankit Panda highlights two factors in a recent Chatham House article that are expected to heighten tripolar competition: the impending expiration of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in 2026 and the US Trump administration’s ambivalence towards alliances. He warns that the end of New START will remove caps on US-Russian arsenals, inflaming an already volatile three-way race.
He argues that China’s drive for parity, Russia’s aggressive posture and weakening US extended deterrence are leading allies across Europe and Asia to contemplate nuclear options of their own.
In Europe, Sophia Besch and Anna Bartoux note in an April 2025 CEIP article that doubts over the US commitment to NATO’s nuclear umbrella are reviving calls for independent deterrence. They write that France and the UK, Europe’s only nuclear powers, are exploring the expansion of nuclear sharing.
They also note that Germany and Poland have advocated for closer nuclear cooperation with France, while French President Emmanuel Macron has signaled a willingness to extend France’s nuclear deterrent to cover European allies.
Yet significant caveats remain. Besch and Bartoux point out that France refuses to relinquish exclusive nuclear decision-making and keeps its arsenal separate from NATO nuclear sharing.
Furthermore, Jacklyn Majneme and Patrick Gill-Tiney mention in a London School of Economics (LSE) article this month that, unlike France, which operates an independent nuclear arsenal, the UK relies on the US to maintain its Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), raising doubts about its nuclear autonomy.
Moreover, Besch and Bartoux emphasize that Europe lacks sufficient fissile material production capability for rapid arsenal expansion, and absent robust conventional forces, an independent European umbrella remains politically and militarily vulnerable to Russian coercion.
In Asia, Joel Petersson-Ivre writes in an April 2025 Asia-Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) report that Japan and South Korea calculate nuclear salience based on US capability and political will. He argues that their trust in the US nuclear umbrella hinges less on the number of warheads than on whether the US would act in a crisis.
He notes that domestic US politics, alliance credibility and shifting power balances all shape nuclear perceptions in Japan and South Korea. He adds that rising Chinese and North Korean threats and doubts on US extended security guarantees have intensified quiet internal debates on indigenous deterrents, including nuclear arms.
On those doubts, Bec Strating notes in an April 2025 article for The Interpreter that US tariffs on Asian allies, a transactional foreign policy, and fears of a US-China grand “deal,” which could prioritize economic ties over security commitments, have cast deep doubts on US resolve.
As the world enters a multipolar nuclear age, old models of deterrence are eroding. What remains is a volatile mix of shifting alliances, opaque intentions and accelerating arms buildups, fueling a cascade of nuclear proliferation with no clear off-ramp and no credible crisis management framework.
