Recent aerial skirmishes over Kashmir saw India lose multiple combat aircraft, including prized French-made Rafale fighters, a Russian-made Su-30 MKI and MiG-29, and an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)—an outcome that, if true, would challenge assumptions about India’s airpower superiority over Pakistan.
The skirmishes may also have showcased the effectiveness of China’s fighter and missile technology over its Western and Russian counterparts, though the human element on each side obviously played a role in the outcomes.
At the tactical level, Pakistan’s edge in missile and fighter aircraft may have been its decisive factor over India. Chief among these was the Chinese-made PL-15E beyond visual range (BVR) missile, whose wreckage was recovered in Punjab, India, marking its combat debut.
According to a report by Justin Bronk of the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the Chinese PL-15 beyond-visual-range (BVR) missile is comparable performance-wise to the US AIM-120 AMRAAM and surpasses the Russian R-77.
Bronk states that the PL-15 is equipped with a small active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar and a dual-pulse solid rocket motor. He estimates the PL-15’s range to be 200 kilometers, though a September 2021 South China Morning Post (SCMP) article states the export version (PL-15E) is capped at 145 kilometers.
Further, Douglas Barrie of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) notes in a September 2022 article that the PL-15’s solid-propellant propulsion achieves faster burnout speeds than the Meteor missile used aboard India’s Rafales.
However, he acknowledges that the Meteor’s ramjet sustainer provides sustained thrust throughout its flight, enhancing mid-course endurance. The capabilities of its launch platform amplify the missile’s advantage.
As for the Chinese-made J-10C fighter’s capability, Bronk notes the variant has an actively electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, a modern infrared search and track (IRST) system, electronic support measures (ESM), radar warning receiver (RWR), missile approach warning suite (MAWS) and datalinks, giving it a better chance of competing with modern opponents in terms of situational awareness.
Bronk says the J-10C can compete with non-fifth-generation aerial opposition, presenting a smaller radar, visual and infrared (IR) signature than Russia’s Su-27 variants, while being competitive with Western single-engine fighters such as the F-16 and Gripen.
He notes that with AESA radar, long-range PL-15 missiles, a modern cockpit and helmet-mounted display, the J-10C and future variants may become the leading near-peer aerial pacing threat for Western states in the 2020s.
While the J-10C surges forward in capability, its Western rivals may be showing signs of age. A January 2025 report by the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI) identifies the Rafale’s lack of radar stealth and dedicated suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) capabilities as significant shortcomings.
It cites senior French Air Force officers who describe combat missions against stealth fighters during joint exercises as “very difficult to win” with the Rafale’s current sensor suite.
The report warns that while the Rafale remains viable in the short to medium term, its limitations could relegate it to a supporting role in high-intensity coalition operations dominated by fifth-generation aircraft.
Further, Rajorshi Roy mentions in an April 2023 article in the peer-reviewed MGIMO Review of International Relations journal that India’s Su-30 MKI fleet has a low readiness rating of just 60% at the time of his writing, partly because of issues surrounding the availability of Russian spare parts for the aircraft type.
At the operational level, Pakistan’s fleet of airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft may have played a decisive role in shooting down Indian fighters.
According to Sebastien Roblin in a 1945 article this month, Pakistan’s Erieye-equipped Saab 2000 airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft are capable of detecting and tracking hostile aircraft at ranges of up to 450 kilometers, including those flying at low altitudes to evade radar.
Roblin notes that these platforms can coordinate with friendly fighters operating with their radars turned off, enhancing stealth and survivability. He adds that the Chinese PL-15 missile, reportedly used by Pakistan in recent skirmishes, is designed to receive mid-course guidance via datalink from AEW&C platforms such as the Saab 2000, allowing it to home in on targets without the launching fighter needing to illuminate them.
Roblin explains that this networked approach denies targeted aircraft early warning until the missile activates its onboard AESA seeker for terminal guidance.
In contrast to Pakistan, Swaim Singh mentions in an August 2022 Center for Air Power Studies (CAPS) article that India is lagging in AEW&C capability to monitor its vast airspace, having only three A-50EI units and the same number of domestically developed Netra Mk 1 planes.
These operational deficiencies also feed into the broader strategic picture, where Pakistan’s aerial victories over India could be China’s strongest sales pitch yet for its fighter aircraft.
While the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) mentions that China was the 4th largest arms seller in 2024, it struggles to sell its fighter aircraft to other countries, with its customers limited to states such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Zambia, Sudan and North Korea.
However, Pakistan’s performance in the recent skirmishes with India could supercharge China’s fighter sales pitch in the Middle East, with countries such as Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia being potential buyers, notes Paul Iddon in an article for Forbes.
Such sales could enable China’s “fighter diplomacy” push, with fighter aircraft’s extensive technical, maintenance and training requirements fostering deeper strategic ties between China and its clients, while also acting as a lever of influence for Beijing.
India and Pakistan may have learned the strategic lessons of the 2019 Balakot airstrikes, guiding their responses in their latest clash over Kashmir.
Muhammad Faisal and Huma Rehman mention in a February 2024 article for South Asian Voices (SAV) that Pakistan’s threshold of risk-acceptance has increased after the Balakot airstrikes, making the use of military force an acceptable response.
Faisal and Rehman add that not responding to violations of territorial sovereignty is not an option for the Pakistani government and military, and that clear diplomatic communication during a conventional, non-nuclear crisis and after similar retaliatory strikes is key to de-escalation.
From India’s perspective, Deependra Hooda mentions in a February 2022 Stimson Center article that the Balakot airstrikes dispelled the notion that the use of airpower is escalatory, noting that the strikes were a clear demonstration of a space within the sub-conventional conflict boundary wherein India can use airpower for targeting yet have escalation control.
In line with those insights, the latest India-Pakistan clashes over Kashmir could be an evolution of a dynamic established during the 1999 Kargil War and refined during the Balakot airstrikes, with both nuclear-armed sides finding room for non-nuclear escalation without courting a nuclear response from either.
Pakistan’s recent success against India’s fighters and at least one drone may not have only shifted South Asia’s airpower balance but also marked China’s arrival as a true global force in aerial warfare and fighter sales.
