China is constructing more large amphibious barges, sending ominous signals about an invasion to come across the Taiwan Strait.
The three modular Shuiqiao-class landing barges, painted in the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) colors, are currently undergoing sea trials near Nanshan Island, the Wall Street Journal reported.
They are equipped with jack-up legs and ramps and designed to integrate with civilian ferries, significantly extending the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) logistics reach in a conflict scenario over Taiwan.
Each modular barge segment has unique capabilities. One is around 360 feet long with a 400-foot bow bridge and four 105-foot jack-up legs. A second segment measures about 440 feet and features two drop-down loading ramps on each side. A third segment, the largest, is approximately 600 feet long and has eight 180-foot jack-up legs.
The WSJ report says the barges can support even China’s heaviest armored vehicles. That allows the PLA to multiply potential landing zones, forcing Taiwan to spread its limited forces across a wider front. While many beaches are fortified and closely monitored, Taiwan’s ability to defend all simultaneously remains constrained.
The WSJ report adds that a second set of these platforms is under construction. This activity suggests China is accelerating efforts to meet President Xi Jinping’s directive for the PLA to be capable of operating against Taiwan by 2027, even if full-scale invasion capability remains aspirational.
These barges are neither game-changers nor decisive assets on their own, but they enhance existing capabilities as enablers.
J Michael Dahm and Thomas Shugart state in a March 2025 China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) report that the Shuiqiao-class barges significantly enhance the PLA’s over-the-shore logistics capacity. They argue the system allows for the transfer of heavy vehicles and equipment in austere areas without fixed port infrastructure.
According to Dahm and Shugart, a single three-barge set can offload anything from light vehicles to 50-ton tanks. However, they point out that the narrow 6-meter-wide bridges limit throughput to single-lane, unidirectional traffic.
They estimate offloading a heavy combined arms battalion—about 150 vehicles—would take 40–60 minutes, making the barges valuable but potentially bottlenecked during high-intensity landings.
These throughput limits draw attention to China’s larger sealift capability challenges. Dennis Blasko notes in an April 2022 CMSI report that despite modernization, the PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) operates only six amphibious combined arms brigades.
Blasko says this accounts for just 7% of the PLAGF’s total brigade force and lacks the lift capacity needed to move an estimated 30,000 troops and more than 2,400 vehicles.
Blasko also says PLA exercises rarely exceed the battalion level and that most sea movement drills rely on civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries or limited PLAN support. Moreover, Blasko points out that China’s amphibious brigades are geographically dispersed, meaning assembling them near embarkation points would require days or even weeks.
Yet, some analysts argue that China has already overcome key transport hurdles. Thomas Shugart writes in an October 2022 War on the Rocks article that China’s sealift capacity is no longer a critical limitation. He argues that China’s use of civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries and vehicle carriers significantly augments its military transport capability.
Shugart notes that China’s civilian shipping now offers over 2.4 million tons of transport capacity, far surpassing the PLAN’s amphibious fleet. He asserts these vessels, designed for fast loading and unloading, could deliver eight heavy brigades and 60,000 troops in an initial wave, with more reinforcements in the following days.
Ian Easton notes in a July 2021 Project 2049 report that Taiwan has 14 beaches suitable for amphibious landings. Bloomberg adds that these locations are well-defended and surrounded by rough terrain and military installations.
Bloomberg also notes that barricades may hinder access. Still, Newsweek reported in December 2023 that more cautious defense analysts believe there could be close to two dozen viable landing sites.
Yet operational viability also depends on environmental conditions. Andrew Erickson writes in an April 2025 article for 1945 that Shuiqiao barges are limited in rough weather and adverse beach conditions. Erickson says the platforms have only been observed in calm waters, suggesting their use may be confined to favorable environments.
Erickson adds that even if the barges deliver vehicles to shore, they do not assist with moving them inland. Poorly located landing sites or inadequate road access could negate any tactical advantage.
More critically, the PLA’s ability to establish and hold a beachhead would face fierce resistance. Ralph Bentley writes in a 2021 Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs article that Taiwan’s defense strategy focuses on denying China a landing foothold. Bentley says Taiwan uses dense littoral defenses, including naval mines, coastal engineering, mobile anti-ship missiles and long-range artillery.
Bentley emphasizes that these tools are designed to attrit Chinese amphibious forces before they can consolidate ashore. He notes that this strategy focuses on destroying vulnerable transport ships as they cross or approach the Strait.
At the strategic level, China’s barge program signals more than military readiness. It projects political resolve and reflects a high-risk, high-reward mindset. Joel Wuthnow writes in an October 2024 article for the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) that a failed invasion would likely lead to prolonged instability.
Wuthnow suggests that in the case of a Chinese military defeat, Beijing might resort to a long-term blockade, cyberattacks, anti-satellite strikes or even nuclear demonstrations.
While the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in such a scenario is unlikely, a failed invasion of Taiwan may lead to military purges and reorientation of capabilities, Wuthnow writes. From this angle, the Shuiqiao barges may matter more as symbols of readiness than systems to actually invade.
Vincent So, writing this month for The Interpreter, draws a parallel with 1949, when Nationalist commander Fu Zuoyi peacefully surrendered Beijing to avoid its destruction.
While the contexts differ, So argues that China may now be trying to convince Taiwan’s leaders and people that unification is inevitable by combining military posturing with cyber operations, economic pressure and the implicit threat embodied by its amphibious buildup.
In this calculus, the barges matter less for what they can do and more for their psychological effect.
