The Wall Street Journal has reported the US military is racing to neutralize Iranian strike capabilities before critical missile interceptors are exhausted, a logistical crisis fueled by a stark cost-exchange imbalance in the Middle East.
Following the killing by bombing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, US President Donald Trump stated the mission is “ahead of schedule, while defense experts warn of dwindling “magazine depth.”
Kelly Grieco, senior fellow at the Stimson Center think tank in Washington, D.C., cautioned that the US is “using [munitions] faster than we can replace them,” highlighting the unsustainable nature of utilizing million-dollar interceptors against cheap Iranian drones.
Strategic analyst Rose Kelanic noted that Iran’s vast arsenal of short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) complicates rapid suppression, necessitating reliance on sophisticated defense systems.
Amidst these shortages, Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasized that US strikes are a defensive necessity to protect US personnel. However, current and former defense officials, including those within US Central Command (CENTCOM), warned that the high expenditure of Standard Missile-3 (SM-3) and Tomahawk missiles risks a “Winchester” scenario of complete ammunition depletion.
This munitions drain, officials say, may force the US to divert stocks from the Pacific, potentially compromising military readiness against China to sustain the ongoing Mediterranean and Persian Gulf operations against Iran and potentially its proxies.
The June 2025 Israel-Iran war exposed a stark cost-exchange dilemma. Ari Cicurel mentions in a July 2025 report for the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) that Iran launched 574 medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) over 12 days, at an estimated total cost of $1.1–$6.6 billion, depending on missile composition.
Cicurel adds that while that aggregate figure appears substantial, many of Iran’s missiles, including Emad variants priced around $250,000 and Ghadr systems at roughly $5 million, are significantly cheaper than the high-end interceptors required to defeat them.
By contrast, Cicurel points out that the US alone expended 92 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors costing roughly $12.7 million each, or about $1.17 billion in total, representing roughly 14% of its stockpile. Combined with Israel, he says interceptor spending reached an estimated $1.48–1.58 billion.
Assuming the same tempo persists over approximately four weeks, as Trump indicated that the ongoing operation might continue, the cost-benefit analysis works both ways.
If the exchange rate scales by roughly 2.33 times, Iran’s 574 MRBMs would rise to about 1,340 missiles, lifting its estimated missile bill to roughly $2.6–$15.4 billion. On the defensive side, US-Israeli interceptor spending would climb from $1.48–$1.58 billion to roughly $3.5–$3.7 billion.
At that pace, US THAAD usage would rise from 92 interceptors to about 215, or roughly one-third of a 632-round stockpile. In pure dollar terms, Iran benefits if its missile mix reflects the lower-cost estimate, while higher-end cost assumptions favor the US and Israel.
Structural weaknesses in interceptor production compound the US problem. In a December 2025 report for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Wes Rumbaugh notes that THAAD and SM-3 buy rates have fluctuated sharply year-to-year—sometimes by over ±100%—undermining stable demand signals for industry.
While Rumbaugh says 534 THAAD interceptors had been delivered to the US by December 2025, a delivery gap since mid-2023 and a backlog of 360 interceptors for Saudi Arabia constrain replenishment capacity.
With US and Israeli interceptors like THAAD and Arrow depleted, a decisive strike may be preferred over a prolonged conflict with Iran. Waiting could enable Iran and partners to restore defenses, increasing the urgency to act.
As Silvia Boltuc mentions in a Special Eurasia report this month, Russia and China have progressively supported Iran as its “eyes” by supplying high-tech capabilities, from satellite surveillance to sophisticated missile guidance systems, thus helping Iran avoid operating in isolation.
Iran is a critical node for Russia’s International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a sanctions-evasion corridor connecting Russia, Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea with Iran, providing access to the Persian Gulf.
For China, Iran is a critical energy source, accounting for 13.4% of its seaborne oil imports last year. Iran’s discounted oil gives China substantial cost savings, helping it compete in its trade war with the US, and is critical to China’s plans against the US over Taiwan.
Boltuc says Russia has focused on enhancing Iran’s situational awareness and air-defense resilience, including orbital reconnaissance assets such as the Kanopus-V (Khayyam) satellite and advanced systems like Su-35 fighters, S-400 air defenses and Rezonans-NE radar.
China’s support may be even more consequential. She points out that Iran has officially transitioned its military architecture from US GPS to China’s Beidou, with the latter system also providing short message service, allowing Iranian command nodes to communicate even if local networks are down.
In addition, she notes that Iran has access to China’s encrypted, high-precision military signals that are resistant to Western jamming.
Boltuc mentions that China uses its fleet of 500+ satellites to support Iran with signals intelligence (SIGINT) and help track US naval movements in the Persian Gulf. Like Russia, Boltuc says China has focused on providing Iran with CM-302 supersonic anti-ship missiles and YLC-8B anti-stealth radar.
Even if Russian and Chinese materiel has not been fully delivered or incorporated in the ongoing hostilities, ISR support from both powers may allow Iran’s battered leadership and military institutions to survive the US-Israeli onslaught and remain functional.
By striking before Russian and Chinese assistance to Iran could be brought to bear, Israel may be using that window of opportunity to decapitate the Iranian regime, with the US aiming for a decisive victory to forestall a looming munitions shortage in the Pacific in a possible war with China over Taiwan. Prolonged hostilities with Iran would only deepen America’s Pacific vulnerability.
A January 2026 Heritage Foundation report warns that high-end interceptors such as SM-3, SM-6, Patriot Advanced Capability 3 Missile Segment Enhancement (PAC-3 MSE) and THAAD would likely be exhausted within days of sustained combat, with some systems depleted after just two to three major People’s Liberation Army (PLA) salvoes.
The report says that aggregate US vertical launch system (VLS) inventories at an estimated 17,000 rounds are insufficient for even one full fleet reload, and pier-side rearming creates multi-week gaps.
It adds that replenishment is constrained by throughput limits of an estimated 500 underway replenishment (UNREP) units a day, and 14-21 day transit times, risking systemic failure within 30–60 days.
US interceptor depletion is not merely a tactical strain but a strategic inflection point — compressing US and Israeli decision-making timelines, incentivizing preemptive and decisive action against Iran and exposing how regional attrition warfare in the Middle East could erode Pacific deterrence and widen vulnerabilities in a conflict over Taiwan.
