Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu recently refused to rule out the assassination of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, calling it a move that could “end the conflict” between the two rivals.
His statement, made during an interview, signaled that Israel now sees the elimination of Iran’s leadership as a legitimate strategic goal. Netanyahu defended recent military operations as efforts to “defang” Iran and likened Khamenei to a “modern Hitler,” a comparison that underscores the gravity of the current escalation.
Israeli airstrikes have hit critical sites in and around Tehran, including the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) headquarters and major components of Iran’s nuclear infrastructure at Fordow and Natanz.
In retaliation, Iran launched over 100 missiles into Israeli territory, with several striking civilian areas in Tel Aviv, killing at least 82 and injuring more than 300 at the time of writing. Israel’s counterattacks have so far killed over 150 individuals in Iran, many of them military personnel stationed at nuclear and strategic installations.
This violent spiral is no longer confined to proxy battles or covert operations. It has escalated into a direct confrontation, with Israel now regarding the removal of Iran’s top leadership as a viable course of action. These developments have pushed the question of leadership succession from theoretical speculation to an immediate political reality.
Iran’s political system, though authoritarian and theocratic, has a constitutional succession process. Article 107 assigns the responsibility of appointing the Supreme Leader to the Assembly of Experts, a group of 88 clerics elected from a vetted pool.
This secretive body plays a decisive role in shaping Iran’s leadership. The last succession in 1989, following Ayatollah Khomeini’s death, saw senior clerics appoint Ali Khamenei, then a relatively obscure figure, based on his ideological alignment, institutional backing, and Khomeini’s endorsement.
Today, the succession landscape is more uncertain. Khamenei, in power for over 35 years, has built a loyal network across the judiciary, military, and clerical ranks. Yet no official successor has been named, and no clear favorite has emerged from the Assembly of Experts. One frequently mentioned figure is his son, Mojtaba Khamenei.
Though not a grand ayatollah, Mojtaba is believed to exert considerable influence behind the scenes, particularly through ties with the IRGC. His potential rise is widely seen as a dynastic move, conflicting with the anti-monarchical ideals of the 1979 Revolution.
His religious credentials have drawn criticism within the clerical class, and his name alone has provoked resistance among reformist factions.
These succession debates are inseparable from the role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Created to protect the Islamic Revolution, the IRGC has transformed into a powerful institution with wide autonomy, often functioning as a state within the state.
It commands over 125,000 active-duty personnel and operates its own intelligence and security apparatus. Economically, it controls major sectors through entities like Khatam al-Anbia and a vast network of affiliated foundations.
In the event of Khamenei’s sudden death or assassination, the IRGC is likely to become the central force in maintaining regime stability. Its influence positions it to shape the succession process in favor of preserving the status quo. In recent years, former IRGC commanders have entered both parliament and the cabinet, extending their reach across all arms of government.
What appears as continuity on paper may not hold under the weight of public discontent. Iran is facing its worst economic crisis in over twenty years. Inflation remains above 40%, the rial has sharply devalued and youth unemployment is over 22%.
A 2023 IranPoll survey found that more than 70% of Iranians distrust the government’s official narratives, and nearly 60% support fundamental political change. The 2022–23 “Woman, Life, Freedom” protests, sparked by the death of Mahsa Amini, were the largest since the 2009 Green Movement. Though the state quelled them through arrests and executions, the core grievances remain.
If a leadership vacuum emerges, these tensions could resurface. Unlike the relatively controlled transition of 1989, today’s Iran is more divided, militarized and economically fragile. A successor without legitimacy or the ability to manage internal factions risks pushing the country into instability.
Historical precedent exists: the fall of Saddam Hussein led to Iraq’s institutional collapse, sectarian violence, and the rise of the Islamic State. While Iran has stronger institutions and a longer tradition of centralized rule, it is not immune.
Ethnic minorities such as Kurds, Baluchs, and Azeris are already demanding greater autonomy. A prolonged power crisis could embolden them and fuel violent fragmentation
It is also likely that, in the absence of a strong leader, Iran’s nuclear program would fall increasingly under the control of hardline military figures. This could result in a much more aggressive posture toward the West, rather than a retreat.
In such a scenario, diplomacy would become more difficult, and the potential for regional conflict would grow. Far from ending hostilities, Khamenei’s assassination could inflame them beyond Israel’s control.
To assume that the death of one man will dismantle an entire regime is a mistake that history has repeatedly exposed. Toppling a figure like Khamenei does not guarantee the emergence of a stable successor, let alone a more moderate or cooperative one.
It risks, instead, the collapse of an entire state apparatus, a power vacuum that could be filled by militia factions, radicalized clerics, or foreign actors. Such instability would have far-reaching consequences, disrupting global oil supplies, jeopardizing critical regional trade corridors and undermining existing nuclear nonproliferation efforts.
If the goal is to eliminate threats, replacing a centralized regime with chaos does the opposite. The Middle East has learned the hard way that toppling leaders is far easier than securing peace in the aftermath.
Rishab Rathi is a research assistant at the Centre of Policy Research and Governance (CPRG), leading the Conflict Studies vertical with a special emphasis on South Asia.
