Karol Nawrocki’s victory in the 2025 Polish presidential election has shattered the optimism of liberal and pro-EU voters in Poland, writes Adam Holesch.
Amid rising tensions over Europe’s future trajectory, the recent elections in Poland and Romania both sharply juxtaposed liberal, pro-European visions with national-conservative and far-right Euroscepticism. In both contests, the mayors of the respective capitals emerged in the second round as standard-bearers for democratic and European values.
Opposing them were candidates who mobilised powerful populist narratives, framing the election as a clash between “we, the people” and “them, the establishment”. Yet while both races were influenced by this polarised narrative, the outcomes diverged significantly. This divergence has profound implications, especially in Poland, where hopes of democratic renewal after 2023 now face serious challenges.
Continuation rather than rupture?
As with many past elections, the 2025 Polish presidential contest is best understood within the context of the two-decade rivalry between Prime Minister Donald Tusk, co-founder of Civic Platform (PO), and Jarosław Kaczyński, co-founder of Law and Justice (PiS).
Since 2005, largely operating from the PiS party headquarters, Kaczyński has polarised Polish society, transforming elections into personal and ideological battles against Tusk. This rivalry has produced alternating victories in parliamentary elections. Tusk’s Civic Platform triumphed in 2007 and 2011, and formed a coalition government after the 2023 elections, despite PiS winning the most votes. In contrast, PiS secured victories in 2005, 2015 and 2019, suggesting a slight electoral edge.
However, presidential elections follow a different pattern. PiS secured victories in 2005, 2015 and 2020, while Civic Platform only succeeded in 2010 under extraordinary circumstances after the plane crash that killed then-president Lech Kaczyński, Jarosław’s twin brother.
Thus, the 2025 result, where PiS-backed Karol Nawrocki narrowly defeated Warsaw Mayor Rafał Trzaskowski, appears more a continuation than a rupture. The outcome closely mirrors 2020 when PiS-backed incumbent Andrzej Duda similarly edged out Trzaskowski. Why, then, has this result reignited fears over Poland’s democratic trajectory?
The presidential veto
The reason is that the 2023 parliamentary elections, hailed as a critical democratic renewal, had set high expectations across Europe. Celebrated by liberals, pro-EU citizens and the European Commission, these elections were the EU’s first significant reversal of democratic backsliding, prompting the conditional release of previously frozen EU funds dependent upon Prime Minister Tusk dismantling PiS-era judicial reforms.
Following this parliamentary shift, the presidency – still held by PiS-backed Andrzej Duda – remained a significant institutional barrier to rule of law reforms. Poland’s president holds substantial veto powers, including informal mechanisms like referring legislation to the Constitutional Tribunal for preemptive review.
Historically, when aligned politically, the presidency typically supports the government. When opposed, however, presidents can become powerful veto players or risk becoming political “lame ducks” if parliament possesses a sufficient majority to override vetoes.
Tusk’s shift to the right
To secure victory in 2025, the governing coalition under Tusk shifted sharply rightward, surprising European partners. Tactics such as continued pushbacks at the Belarusian border, suspending asylum rights and adopting a hostile stance toward refugees and migrants entered mainstream Polish politics, shocking even figures like filmmaker Agnieszka Holland. Although justified to the EU as necessary manoeuvres to outflank PiS long-term, these moves risked alienating Tusk’s base.
On Ukraine, Tusk linked Poland’s support for Kyiv’s EU accession to historical acknowledgments and exhumation of Polish victims from the Volhynia massacres – a stance traditionally associated with the far-right Konfederacja. Additionally, Foreign Minister Radosław Sikorski’s anti-Ukrainian rhetoric and Trzaskowski’s proposal to reduce benefits for unemployed Ukrainian women signalled broader rightward shifts. This aligns with populist theory suggesting that adopting far-right positions often backfires, as voters prefer the “original” source.
Trzaskowski’s defeat can partly be explained by miscalculations about PiS’s historical advantage in presidential elections and Nawrocki’s successful populist positioning. Unlike Romania, where urban liberal mobilisation secured victory, Poland’s demographics – largely rural and small-town – favoured Nawrocki’s “common people” narrative.
Furthermore, re-democratisation and rule of law were not salient issues for voters. More pressing was the coalition’s failure to reform Poland’s restrictive abortion law, a key pledge hampered internally and publicly blamed on presidential veto threats. This alienated – among others – liberal female voters instrumental in the 2023 victory.
Consequences of Nawrocki’s win
The immediate consequence is a loss of momentum for liberals. Despite surviving an early confidence vote, Tusk faces a challenging task holding together a diverse coalition without the unifying optimism of 2023. Left-wing coalition partners increasingly oppose Tusk’s rightward shift, and polling now favours a possible PiS-led parliamentary majority by 2027, strengthened by Konfederacja’s rise. Nawrocki will likely obstruct Tusk’s legislative agenda, while Jarosław Kaczyński actively courts coalition MPs to fracture government stability.
A second consequence is the intensifying challenge of cohabitation, demanding strategic recalibration. President Duda previously stalled critical reforms by referring legislation to the PiS-controlled Constitutional Tribunal, and he vetoed key measures, including amendments to the Election Law and the bill disbanding the Russian Influence Commission. Tusk’s government, anticipating presidential obstruction, hesitated to introduce contentious legislation, particularly on abortion, reinforcing perceptions of inertia.
Nawrocki’s presidency and the rule of law
Nawrocki, a more staunchly conservative figure than Duda, might cooperate selectively (for instance on migration and Russia policy) but will likely resist rule of law reforms vigorously. Thus, the strategy known as “Transition 2.0”, which relied on future cooperation by a Civic Platform president, now requires fundamental reassessment.
Though some reforms were enacted by the Tusk government regarding the Constitutional Tribunal, the National Court Register and judicial disciplinary practices, Justice Minister Adam Bodnar also faced criticism for slow reforms and limited accountability measures. With Nawrocki in power and the Constitutional Tribunal still loyal to PiS, the prospects for constitutional resolution appear severely constrained.
Nawrocki is expected to resist liberal legislative initiatives, including easing abortion laws, extending LGBTQI+ protections and broadening hate speech laws. Despite these obstacles, Tusk must proceed with drafting promised legislation to maintain credibility and signal commitment to democratic norms, even if only symbolically.
Prospects and risks for the future
Despite current setbacks, the cohabitation need not signal the end of Poland’s re-democratisation process. Poland’s political system limits presidential dominance, ensuring the Tusk government can still achieve policy milestones, potentially securing a veto-overriding parliamentary majority by 2027. However, significant risks remain, particularly coalition fragility and voter disillusionment.
From a broader European perspective, electoral politics increasingly resembles a competitive match between pro-EU and sovereigntist forces. While Romania resisted far-right advances and the governing coalition in the Netherlands with Geert Wilders’ PVV broke apart, Poland – until recently a beacon of democratic renewal – is struggling to maintain its momentum. The critical question remains: can Tusk recalibrate effectively, or has Poland’s path to democratic renewal stalled indefinitely?
Note: This article gives the views of the author, not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and Policy or the London School of Economics. Featured image credit: canon_photographer / Shutterstock.com
