With the New START treaty set to expire, the US Air Force is gearing up to surge warhead deployments to outmatch and deter nuclear rivals China and Russia.
This month, Air & Space Forces Magazine reported that the US Air Force is prepared to expand its nuclear arsenal upon the expiration of the New START Treaty in February 2026, according to General Thomas Bussiere, head of US Air Force Global Strike Command.
Speaking at an Atlantic Council forum, Bussiere said that, if directed, the service could increase warhead deployments across its Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) and bomber fleet.
The nuclear arms control treaty, which has been in effect since 2011 and has limited the number of nuclear launchers in the US and Russia, will lapse following Russia’s 2023 decision not to extend it.
Efforts to modernize US deterrence capabilities, including the Sentinel ICBM, have faced scrutiny due to soaring costs and delays. Lawmakers pressed US Air Force officials to demonstrate urgency in correcting the troubled program, which is projected to cost nearly US$141 billion and fall years behind schedule.
Simultaneously, the US Department of Defense (DOD) is assessing the viability of expanding the B-21 Raider fleet beyond the planned 100 aircraft to counter growing nuclear threats from China and North Korea.
House Armed Services Committee members remain concerned about funding priorities and nuclear force readiness, while Secretary Troy Meink emphasized that strategic deterrence remains paramount for national defense. Bussiere hinted that future adversarial developments might necessitate a more robust nuclear force posture beyond existing plans.
Al Mauroni mentions in a December 2023 War on the Rocks article that the US could increase its readily deployed nuclear warheads beyond New START Treaty limits by utilizing warheads from the nuclear stockpile’s active hedge, which are those that are not operationally deployed.
Mauroni points out that this effectively means the US could “upload” additional nuclear warheads onto existing missiles and bombers without building new weapons.
Hans Kristensen and other writers mention in a January 2025 article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists that while the US currently deploys 400 Minuteman III ICBMs, each armed with one warhead, the missiles can carry two or three warheads each.
Kristensen and others state that the Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM) can carry eight warheads each, although they typically carry an average of four to five.
In terms of bombers, a March 2025 US Congressional Research Service (CRS) report states that the US Air Force may require at least 200 stealth bombers to meet operational demands, particularly given the high tempo of Bomber Task Force missions and the reliance on Cold War-era platforms still in frontline use.
Putting a number on the potential increase of US warheads, Keith Payne and Mark Schneider mention in an article this month for the National Institute of Public Policy that without New START limitations, the US Trident SLBM force could increase from an estimated 960 to 1,626 deployed warheads, while the Minuteman III ICBM force could increase from an estimated 400 to 1,000 deployed warheads, for a deployed missile force of 2,626 warheads.
For bombers, Payne and Schneider estimate that the US could increase its stockpile of 528 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) to 716 to 784 warheads.
However, the US nuclear triad is in dire need of modernization. Heather Williams and Lachlan MacKenzie mention in an April 2025 article for the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that the US Air Force is currently looking to extend the lifespan of its Minuteman III ICBMs, which are decades past retirement, while its Sentinel replacement is hounded by budget overruns and delays.
Regarding the US’s undersea nuclear deterrent, a March 2025 US CRS report notes that the US operates 14 Ohio-class SSBNs, which are approaching the end of their service lives. The report states that the SSBNs were initially designed for a 30-year service life but were later recertified for an additional 12 years. The report notes that the Ohio SSBNs will reach the end of their operational lives from 2027 to 2040.
While the report states that the US is building 12 Columbia-class SSBNs to replace the Ohio-class fleet, the lead unit is facing a 12- to 16-month delay, which could impact the timely replacement of the Ohio-class fleet.
While Williams and MacKenzie note that the B-21 bomber program is on track, a June 2024 US Government Accountability Office (GAO) report states that the Long Range Standoff (LRSO) program, intended to replace the AGM-86 ALCM aboard US bombers, faces risks in schedule and cost estimates due to tight timelines and overlapping testing phases.
It also mentions that while the LRSO program has made design progress and early manufacturing preparations, challenges remain in software integration and meeting nuclear certification requirements, which could affect the missile’s timely deployment and operational readiness.
Williams and MacKenzie assert that the US defense industrial base and nuclear enterprise have atrophied since the end of the Cold War, with decades of underinvestment and consolidation eroding its nuclear defense-industrial base, leaving it ill-equipped for renewed great power competition.
When New START expires next year, the US must ensure its nuclear deterrent effectively dissuades both China and Russia from nuclear aggression, including if the two US rivals act together.
Meanwhile, Russia is deploying new systems, such as the Avangard and Poseidon, and China is expanding its ICBM silo fields and maturing a true nuclear triad—thereby intensifying the arms race that the US appears to be struggling to keep pace with.
In an April 2023 Atlantic Council report, Keir Lieber and Daryl Press mention that in a nuclear tripolar world with China, Russia and the US all fielding large arsenals, the US must deter two peer rivals simultaneously, each capable of massive retaliation.
However, they point out that the US’s current counterforce doctrine, which eschews threats to enemy cities while targeting military assets, requires a large, survivable arsenal capable of retaliating against one adversary while still deterring the other, thereby escalating the risks of an arms race.
In addition, they argue that a pure counterforce doctrine increases force demands without improving deterrence.
Lieber and Press propose a hybrid US nuclear doctrine, with counterforce options for limited scenarios but threatening countervalue retaliation targeting cities, industrial assets and population centers in extreme ones. They assert a hybrid doctrine would more credibly deter China and Russia while avoiding an excessive force buildup.
With New START set to expire in early 2026, the US’s nuclear future hinges not just on how many warheads it can deploy but how credibly it can deter two giants bent on intensifying their nuclear threats.
