President Donald Trump marked the first 100 days of his return to the White House on April 29. Though largely symbolic, this milestone is often a gauge of the incumbent’s governing instincts, priorities, and direction moving forward. Historically, the opening stretch offers a window of political momentum – a chance to push bold initiatives before opposition resistance stiffens.

Trump has wasted no time seizing that opportunity. In just three months, he has launched an arguably aggressive and often polarizing agenda, moving swiftly on border enforcement, sweeping subsidy cuts, protectionist trade measures and a fundamental overhaul of US foreign policy.

His team has racked up early wins on some fronts – but major global flashpoints, from the war in Ukraine to the conflict in Gaza, stubbornly remain in a quagmire. True to form, if Trump finds his efforts further stalling, the president may pivot to another arena where he believes a breakthrough is more within reach. In that case, North Korea, long dormant on Washington’s radar, could find itself back on the agenda.

In an interview for Asia Times, former US National Security Advisor John Bolton discussed Trump’s opening sprint, the grinding stalemate in Ukraine and the evolving geopolitical dynamics in Northeast Asia. A fixture in American diplomacy, Bolton has served in several key roles across Republican administrations, including as ambassador to the UN.

How would you assess Trump’s first 100 days in office?

In the international sphere, it’s been marked with a lot of failures and incompletions. Trump certainly did not achieve a ceasefire in Ukraine in 24 hours, not to mention in 100 days. If anything, it looks like the ceasefire effort is stalled and there’s no prospect of it moving forward. The situation in the Middle East remains unresolved. Negotiations with Iran don’t appear to have much traction, but we don’t know how long Trump will pursue them.

​​Most importantly, for the wider world, the Trump tariffs in the first 100 days are an economic disaster waiting to happen for the US and particularly its friends and allies. We don’t know whether we will have a trade war with the whole world at once or whether negotiations may solve some of it. But it certainly looks like we’ll have a trade war with China.

We haven’t done the preparation that should be necessary – to get our friends and allies together because they’re suffering from many of the same unfair practices that China’s played against the US. I’m also worried about the effect it has on American relations with countries all over the world, who wonder what this means in terms of future relations with Washington.

Do you see cease-fire talks over Ukraine producing any meaningful progress?

I don’t see a real chance for progress. The parties have significantly different views on what outcomes they would find acceptable. And they cross each other’s red lines in many areas. Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity are a red line for Ukraine. But, really, the Kremlin’s objective here ultimately is to conquer all of Ukraine.

So I’m not even sure if you could get to a ceasefire, or that it will last for any significant amount of time. When the parties are that far apart, that implies a long-term negotiation to resolve the differences. And, in the meantime, the Russians continue to try and move forward, which they’re doing – but very, very slowly and at a very high cost.

Putin thinks he’s got the momentum. That may be right, although it’s not much momentum. And that’s another incentive for him not to make a deal at this point.

Can you elaborate on your view of Putin’s ultimate motive?

What Putin said beginning in 2005, and many other statements since then, he basically wants to recreate the Russian Empire. And you can’t have a Russian empire in their view without having Ukraine. Putin began military action in 2014 and got maybe nine or ten percent of Ukraine. He’s continued it. The Russians now hold about 20 percent. It’s a slow process and highly costly to Russia in terms of lost lives, wounded and the economic consequences as well.

I think the advantage to Putin of a ceasefire, if you take it, is that it gives him a chance to rebuild the Russian army, which has been very badly damaged in the current war. Once he rebuilds the Russian army and the Black Sea fleet, then I think he’s in a position to try the third invasion.

This is why Volodymyr Zelensky, the Ukrainian president, has stressed the importance of security guarantees. It’s not enough just to get a ceasefire in the current conflict. It’s what you can put in place if you can’t have NATO membership for Ukraine, which Russia rules out and which I don’t think Trump would push. [If so,] then what are the security guarantees that Ukraine can receive that would deter a future Russian invasion?

Reports suggest Trump’s team is exploring a return to talks with Pyongyang. Do you see him re-engaging with Kim Jong Un?

That’s possible. But I worry that that might mean a meeting in Pyongyang, since it’s hard to imagine how you get the headlines of simply another meeting in Singapore or some other Asian city. And that would be very much in North Korea’s interest.

The Trump administration should wait until the political situation in South Korea is clarified one way or the other. Doing anything significant with North Korea on the nuclear front would be a very bad signal that we weren’t willing to wait for South Korea’s politics to clear up. Even if the administration in Washington has indicated interest toward Pyongyang, I think there shouldn’t be any real movement on that until things are clear.

Do you think Trump could come to terms with a nuclear North Korea?

Well, I hope not. I mean, that phrase has been used, but honestly, I don’t think he fully understands what it means. And, certainly, the declared policy of the United States remains the complete, verifiable and irreversible denuclearization of North Korea. That’s what the policy should be. And as I say, now with Marco Rubio, at least for a short period, being both secretary of state and national security advisor, that’s been Rubio’s view for a long time.

Some in Seoul argue that hardliners in Trump’s first administration ultimately scuttled a potential deal at the 2019 Hanoi Summit. What’s your view?

Trump pulled back just in time, not to make concessions to North Korea that would have been fatal. You know, North Korea has run the same playbook for many years. It agrees to denuclearize in exchange for tangible economic benefits, light fuel oil, light reactors, heavy fuel oil and relief from sanctions. And the benefits to North Korea are always front-end loaded.

The responsibilities of North Korea, that is to say, to denuclearize, come later. So North Korea agrees to denuclearize, gets the economic benefits, and then reneges on their part. And going through that again, which is what Kim Jong-un wanted to see in Hanoi, was just unacceptable and should be unacceptable.

What’s one thing you would advise the Trump team on North Korea?

When the government in South Korea is resolved, I would talk immediately about what to do to face the combined threat – not just of North Korea’s nuclear program, but China’s hegemonic ambitions along its Indo-Pacific periphery. South Korea made a very important decision a year or so ago when it agreed to trilateral military maneuvers with the US and Japan. I think there are things we need to strengthen and advance on that front.

There’s a growing realization in South Korea that an attack on Taiwan by China would be an attack on South Korea as well. So this whole East Asian security question, I think, is getting more complicated and urgent. And South Korea has a critical role to play. So I recommend that South Korea be included in the Quad, joining India, Japan, Australia, and the US, thus forming a five-power operation that allows South Korea to participate with its economic, political, and military significance.

If South Korea’s presidency shifts to the left, how might that alter Seoul’s approach to North Korea?

We’ve seen variations of the Sunshine Policy through several different South Korean presidencies. All aimed at, in their view, getting a satisfactory resolution of a lot of issues, particularly the nuclear issue with North Korea. But they have all failed.

You can try it again, but you’re going to get the same result. So whatever the people of South Korea decide, obviously, that’s their choice to make. And that’s the government the US would work with. But whoever it is, getting a realistic view of what Kim Jong Un wants to achieve is crucial. He wants to reunite the Korean Peninsula under his government, and the nuclear capability provides him with a considerable bit of leverage.