North Korea may be ramping up tank production in the next possible step of its quid pro quo assistance to Russia in the Ukraine war.

Multiple media outlets this month reported that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un inspected a major tank production facility, emphasizing the urgent need to modernize the country’s armored forces with domestically developed tanks and self-propelled artillery.

According to state media outlet Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), Kim toured the unnamed factory with senior officials, including Jo Chun Ryong and Kim Yong Hwan, to assess production progress and ongoing research into key technologies.

He praised advancements in firepower, engine output, electronic warfare and crew comfort, citing them as evidence of progress toward building high-performance, Korean-style tanks.

Kim called for a strategic rethinking of armored warfare and directed the development of large-scale production capacity—efforts he described as crucial to achieving the ruling party’s “second revolution in armored force.”

Although KCNA did not identify the facility’s location, South Korean lawmaker Yu Yong-Weon suggested it may be in Kusong, North Pyongan province, and possibly linked to the models shown at a 2023 military exhibition.

Kim’s factory visit underscores North Korea’s broader drive to bolster its conventional forces alongside strategic weapons development, reflecting its military modernization priorities amid deepening cooperation with Russia.

While North Korean tanks are outmatched by the modern armored fleets of the US and South Korea, Pyongyang may see tank production as a means of supporting Russia’s forces in Ukraine.

While unconfirmed, the timing and nature of the factory visit suggest this production drive may be aimed at future exports to Russia.

If so, this would extend its assistance beyond munitions, ballistic missiles and troop deployments to include tanks, reinforcing its quid pro quo arrangement in return for cash, technology transfers and political backing.

Newsweek reported in April 2025 that North Korea has earned an estimated US$20 billion from its involvement in the Ukraine war, mostly from munitions sales with a smaller amount for providing troops and technical personnel. Additionally, Asia Times has noted that Russian support may have significantly advanced North Korea’s nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) programs.

Beyond transactional motives, North Korea’s support for Russia may also reflect its strategic interest in diversifying partnerships and reducing reliance on China.

Choong-Koo Lee writes in a February 2025 War on the Rocks article that China’s renewed dialogue with South Korea and Japan, coordination on sanctions on North Korea’s nuclear program and resumption of military talks with the US could have dismayed the Kim regime, nudging it closer to Russia.

North Korea’s tank production capacity could prove valuable to Russia, whose armored forces have been heavily depleted by over three years of high-intensity combat in Ukraine.

In a June 2023 article for the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), Marcin Piotrowski notes North Korea has copied and modified Soviet-era T-62 tanks and maintains active production lines with at least 2,000 units.

Piotrowski emphasizes that although Russia no longer produces the T-62, it continues to draw on this model from Soviet-era reserves, making North Korea a valuable supplier of spare parts and compatible shells for 115mm and 125mm guns.

While obsolete by modern standards, these tanks use ammunition and parts compatible with Russian stockpiles. Russia’s staggering tank losses and strained production capacity further raise the value of such assistance.

According to open-source intelligence (OSINT) group Oryx, Russia lost 3,960 tanks between February 2022 and May 2025. Veaceslav Epureanu, writing for Insider in February 2025, states that by December 2024, Russia had depleted half of its estimated 7,342 Soviet-era tanks in open storage before the war.

Epureanu also noted that Russia had 1,897 T-62s in storage in 2022, which had declined to 1,082 by 2024, with only half deemed in good or satisfactory condition. His data shows that the T-62 remains Russia’s most numerous tank in open storage despite its age.

In a July 2024 Forbes article, David Axe points out that T-62s are relatively abundant and easier to restore than more modern types such as the T-72, T-80, and T-90.

He argues that even though Russia’s factories can produce only 500-600 new tanks annually—a rate too low to compensate for attrition—relying on T-62s may be Russia’s only viable short-term solution to sustain its armored strength.

However, this strategy has its limits. Pavel Luzin writes in a January 2025 article for the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) that 2025 may be the final year Russia can depend on Soviet-era reserves.

He cites equipment degradation, reliance on foreign components, shortages of skilled workers, inflation and a weak ruble as key constraints forcing Russia to shift toward newly manufactured equipment.

Similarly, Yurri Clavilier and Michael Gjerstad, in a February 2025 report for the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), estimate that while Russia managed to refurbish around 1,500 tanks in 2024, the remaining units in storage are likely in poor condition and would require more extensive restoration efforts. Clavilier and Gjerstad say this situation complicates Russia’s ability to replace battlefield losses at the current pace of attrition.

Even if North Korea can supply Russia with more T-62s or similar models, their impact on the battlefield may be limited. Peter Suciu notes in a January 2025 article for The National Interest (TNI) that the T-62 is highly vulnerable to modern threats such as drones, mines and anti-tank missiles, and is being deployed primarily because Russia lacks better alternatives.

Nevertheless, North Korean tank production could help Russia reconstitute its armored forces in quantity. The Robert Lansing Institute stated in a March 2025 report that it could take Russia up to a decade to rebuild its inventory of tanks, jets and armored vehicles to pre-war levels and regain the capacity for large-scale offensive operations against NATO.

In this light, North Korea’s vintage tanks may be less about battlefield advantage and more about buying time for Russia’s defense industry. The tank transfer would be a stopgap driven by mutual need and a shared rejection of the Western-dominated international order.