As fighting spreads across the Gulf, the war is often portrayed as a unified campaign against Iran. It is not. The reality, as is often the case in the Middle East, is more complicated.
The United States and Israel both view Iran as a dangerous adversary. But dangerous to whom, in what way, and toward what end? On those questions — the ones that determine how wars are fought and how they end — Washington and Jerusalem are operating from different strategic playbooks.
For Israel, the confrontation with Iran is a matter of survival. Iran’s nuclear ambitions, its support for proxies like Hezbollah and the Houthis, and its openly declared aim of destroying Israel present serious threats to a country with limited strategic depth.
From Jerusalem’s perspective, the objective in any war with Iran is straightforward: dismantle the nuclear program, degrade the Iranian military and break the regional network that sustains it. Anything less risks merely postponing the threat.
Washington’s calculus is much broader. The US must keep the Strait of Hormuz open, through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s traded oil flows. It must avoid a regional escalation that could draw in powers such as Russia or China at a moment when both are already challenging the international order.
And after two decades of costly intervention in the Middle East, Washington has little appetite for another open-ended war.
Those constraints push American strategy toward narrower objectives: significantly degrade Iran’s nuclear capabilities, strike the conventional capacity of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and restore deterrence—without necessarily seeking regime collapse.
A weakened but stable Iran, pushed back toward negotiations, might be acceptable for Washington. However, it is far less acceptable for Jerusalem.
The differences go beyond war aims. They influence timelines, risk tolerance and expectations for what happens next.
Israel operates under a sense of urgency that American planners do not share. Every month that Iranian centrifuges spin and missile factories expand brings Tehran closer to a threshold Israeli defense doctrine has long treated as intolerable.
American policymakers, by contrast, tend to evaluate conflicts through political and fiscal cycles. A prolonged confrontation in the Gulf fits into neither.
Risk tolerance also varies. Israel might be willing to endure heavy rocket attacks from Hezbollah, renewed fighting in Gaza and the expected wave of international criticism. It has coped with these pressures throughout its history.
The US faces a different calculus. Its economy supports the global financial system, and its alliance commitments extend from Europe to the Pacific. Instability in the Gulf is not limited to the region; it affects energy markets, financial systems, and domestic politics.
Can these interests be reconciled? Only partially—and only with deliberate coordination at the highest levels.
In the immediate term, the overlap is real. Both countries want Iran’s nuclear infrastructure crippled. Both seek to weaken the Revolutionary Guard and demonstrate that Iranian proxy warfare carries a cost.
On these objectives, the alliance remains strong. American military capabilities are unmatched, while Israel’s intelligence penetration of Iranian networks is formidable. The divergence may emerge once the first phase of strikes ends and the debate shifts from what to destroy to what comes next.
Washington will inevitably look for a diplomatic off-ramp—some revised version of the framework once attempted under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or a similar arrangement that allows both sides to step back from escalation.
Israel will be far more skeptical of any outcome that leaves the Islamic Republic capable of rebuilding its nuclear program within a decade.
Pressure on Washington—from Gulf partners, European allies and financial markets—would be intense. Israel, in turn, may fear that an American administration could trade long-term security concerns for short-term geopolitical stability.
History suggests such tensions are hardly unprecedented. Strategic disagreements have surfaced repeatedly within the alliance, including over the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran. The partnership endured, but the underlying differences never fully disappeared.
Reconciling American and Israeli interests in the current conflict is possible, but it will require candor. Washington must acknowledge the scale of Israel’s security concerns, while Israel must recognize the limits of what even the US is willing or able to sustain.
The US and Israel share an enemy. But unless their objectives are aligned, they may discover too late that they were never fighting the same war.
Eric Alter is a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Middle East programs and a former UN civil servant.
