China is rapidly expanding its reach across the Indo-Pacific, deploying a shadow fleet of nominally civilian fishing vessels as a covert extension of the world’s largest naval force.
By weaponizing hundreds of thousands of fishing boats alongside the Chinese Navy (PLAN) and Coast Guard (CCG), Beijing has developed a gray zone militia strategy that threatens to blockade American and allied naval forces should a Taiwan contingency or conflict in the South China Sea erupt.
Both the PLAN and CCG have conducted gray zone operations around disputed islands and territorial waters claimed by Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines — with the fishing militia serving as the cutting edge of a hybrid warfare doctrine designed to encroach on neighboring territory while evading direct military confrontation.
A central pillar of this strategy is the so-called “iron triangle” around the Philippines, where fishing vessels, coast guard ships and naval forces operate in concert.
Given the degree of coordination between these nominally civilian vessels and the PLAN, Western governments have solid grounds to designate the fishing militia as a de facto extension of China’s naval forces.
Maritime deception
Rather than deploying PLAN vessels directly to form barriers and mock blockades, China’s strategy relies on civilian fishing vessels as a cover for naval activities. The US Naval Institute has estimated that China has 200,000 fishing vessels that the state could weaponize.
According to a January 2026 US congressional report, Washington has documented evidence that Beijing’s maritime fishing vessels are used to expand Chinese influence, monopolize sea lanes and push Indo-Pacific nations toward economic dependency.
The report further notes that China’s military command, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and the ruling Communist Party under Xi Jinping maintain full oversight of these fishing vessels, deploying them as pieces on Beijing’s geopolitical chessboard.
The shadow fleet is activated in disputed waters during periods of heightened regional tension, as seen near Japan and the Philippines, and withdrawn before allied diplomatic responses can take shape.
With more than US$5 trillion in global shipping transiting the Asia-Pacific annually, Beijing seeks complete oversight of all maritime movements, using the PLAN and CCG to mask their activities behind fishing vessels.
Any disruption to these shipping lanes could prove devastating to the global economy and key regional economies, including Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and the US.
Much as Russia deployed “little green men” to maintain plausible deniability during its first invasion of Ukraine and seizure of Crimea, China could similarly employ its maritime fishing militia as “little blue men” in flashpoints such as Japan’s Ryukyu Islands and Philippine-claimed islets.
Growing gray zone
On Christmas Day, December 25, 2025, more than 2,000 Chinese fishing vessels deployed to the East China Sea and assembled a mock blockade in a reverse L-shape formation. Two weeks later, on January 14, 2026, 1,400 fishing vessels performed a similar maneuver in the same waters.
As China escalates these fishing vessel tactics — coercion, hybrid warfare and mock blockades — Tokyo’s posture has sharpened the context. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has ended strategic ambiguity over Taiwan, directly stating that Japan will militarily defend Taipei against Beijing, triggering a significant diplomatic rupture.
Alongside economic pressure — including restrictions on Chinese tourism and foreign labor in Japan — the CCP is pursuing information and hybrid warfare against the Takaichi administration, with intimidation via fishing vessel deployments emerging as the latest instrument.
China’s use of nominally civilian fishing vessels serves not only as intimidation but also as a legal shield, complicating an American response under international law.
Under the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs), US and allied naval vessels are prohibited from interfering with boats actively engaged in fishing, giving Beijing room to maneuver through what analysts call “lawfare.”
Should Japan, Taiwan or the Philippines directly engage the PLAN’s maritime militia, China would invoke COLREGs in international courts while retaliating through economic and trade sanctions.
With a permanent UN Security Council seat and the world’s second-largest economy, Beijing is well positioned to use its international standing to deflect condemnation of its maritime militia operations.
Response options
As China’s maritime strategy grows harder to confront directly, the US and regional allies have several options.
The first is enhanced diplomatic cooperation on fishing rights and the enforcement of international law in territorial waters, including under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Second, sharing intelligence assets and using diplomatic back channels across the Indo-Pacific will be crucial to countering Beijing’s maritime militia without direct confrontation.
Identifying the bases and ports where PLAN maritime militias stage operations, along with their commanders, could provide actionable intelligence for regional partners, enabling targeted sanctions and restrictions on militia commanders’ movements.
Third, strengthening the coast guards of partner nations will support law enforcement and deterrence as China seeks to exploit security gaps to deploy its maritime fishing militia.
Joint patrols offer another avenue, as seen in Japan, France and the United Kingdom, increasing naval deployments around Indo-Pacific flashpoints.
Finally, a graduated diplomatic warning system could be established. In a wartime scenario — a Taiwan contingency or South China Sea armed clash — Beijing must be put on notice that fishing vessels acting as extensions of the PLAN will be treated as such following repeated warnings to disperse.
By issuing repeated warnings and allowing time for the militia to withdraw, the CCP cannot hide behind COLREGs and risks confrontation if the vessels persist in mock blocking maneuvers.
Although China has pursued a calculated and sophisticated strategy by concealing its maritime militia within civilian fishing fleets, Beijing’s seaborne tactics carry the seeds of their own failure.
Having demonstrated a willingness to disregard international law while selectively weaponizing it, China’s adversaries retain several courses of action — offering the PLAN a path to de-escalation or risking direct confrontation should a Taiwan contingency or comparable flashpoint materialize.
Julian McBride is a defense analyst and contributing editor at 19FortyFive.
