The Trump administration is trying to work out a settlement to the Ukraine war. Part of the formula for success is convincing Russia to settle for less than what it wants, and convincing the Ukrainians to agree to a deal that Washington prefers. On the table for Russia are economic incentives and Nord Stream appears likely to be one of them.
The Ukrainian problem is simple. When push comes to shove, and supposing Washington really has a deal in hand with Russia, one that it can potentially sell to the American people and the surging nationalists in Europe, Washington will want to change Ukraine’s leadership in order to get Kyiv to accept a settlement. This won’t happen through elections. Zelensky will not allow elections until after the war is ended (on his terms) and he says he plans on at least three more years of war. So the alternative for the Trump administration is to force a change to a more compliant leadership.
Washington has big leverage because it can withhold arms and intelligence, vital to Ukraine’s ability to hold off the Russians. Zelensky’s strategy is to avoid this outcome by stretching out the war as long as possible, seeking an end to Trump and his replacement by a pro-Ukraine American government and pro-war Democrats. The math says that Trump has only a short time to apply significant leverage on Ukraine.
Trump won’t make a move unless he has convinced the Russians that the best outcome is a deal with the United States.
The Russian economy is straining, and Washington continues to block exports of Russian oil, something that is having a fairly dramatic impact on Russian revenues. Even though Russia is an industrialized country, its top exports are minerals including oil and natural gas. Between 40% and 50% of Russia’s exports are oil and gas, and related refined oil and gas products.
By comparison, US energy exports, while surging, remain a small portion of total US exports. Oil is about 2.8% of overall US exports, natural gas 2.2%.
Trump and his advisors are seeking a way to convince the Russians to make a deal and, in return, grow their economy thanks to re-enabled oil and gas exports and western investment.
While Washington may cook a deal and end the current war in Ukraine, the Europeans won’t support it and will try and keep sanctions on Russia. The EU and leading politicians in Europe (especially the UK, France and Germany, the Big Three) argue that Russia is an existential threat and settling the Ukraine war will simply move the potential front line closer to NATO. They see it as crucial to rebuild Europe’s armies, possibly acquire nuclear weapons independent of the United states, and continue to exclude Russian energy from Europe through sanctions and EU regulations. In short, Europe is running a proxy war against Russia and wants to keep it going.
Washington’s geopolitics are different from Europe’s. In Asia, where a large part of America’s economy and prosperity are anchored, Washington faces problems far bigger than Russia. Especially if Taiwan falls, a rising China would be almost a non-recoverable blow to the United States. There is no doubt, discounting all the double talk, that Washington seeks to stabilize Europe by cooking a deal with Russia, in essence a new paradigm to replace the now obsolete geopolitics following the collapse of the USSR.
Washington is now seeking “incentives” for Russia that will give Putin enough assurance to cut a deal. One key factor could be restoring Russian natural gas exports to Europe, particularly natural gas for Germany.
The current German government strongly opposes any restoration of Russian natural gas deliveries, even though Russian gas would probably save Germany’s failing economy.
Newspapers in Germany and France have now “uncovered” allegedly secret talks between representatives of the Trump administration, including private investors, and the Nord Stream 2 organization. Among the news outlets are the Berliner Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung, Die Zeit, Le Monde and Les Echoes. The US goal is to restart Nord Stream 2 but with new ownership.
There are two Nord Stream pipelines, the original Nord Stream (Nord Stream 1) and the new pipeline, Nord Stream 2. Nord Stream 2 has different ownership from Nord Stream 1.
Both pipelines were attacked on September 26, 2022. The dual pipes of Nord Stream 1 were destroyed, and one pipeline strand of Nord Stream 2 was damaged (the other was not hit). If Germany would permit it, as the Russians have said from time to time, Nord Stream 2 could be brought back into operation in a year or less.
Germany has repurposed the onshore parts of Nord Stream for LNG distribution (after regasification). At the present time, LNG is around 16% to 17% of the total gas used in Germany. The US supplies over 90% of the LNG to Germany. Another 46% of natural gas for Germany comes from Norway by pipeline. The math would change if Nord Stream 2 was fully restored. It could provide 55 billion cubic centimeters of natural gas to Germany, enough to heat some 26 million homes, and would be significantly cheaper than Norwegian gas.
Legal issues
Russian natural gas deliveries are blocked under EU sanctions such as Regulation (EU) 2026/261, and by the German government under laws including the Energy Security Act (EnSiG) and the Energy Industry Act (EnWG).
The German government-authorized takeover of Nord Stream 2 on-shore processing sites remains a matter of legal dispute; it has been called a hostile takeover at bargain basement buyout prices.
Reuters reports that the German government is tightening foreign trade laws to prevent Russian-owned or foreign entities from acquiring these critical, though damaged, infrastructure sites, aiming to secure them against strategic takeovers
US proposal
The actual US proposal is unclear, but according to press reports it would involve the takeover of Nord Stream 2 AG based in Switzerland, now 100% owned by Russia’s Gazprom. There are foreign debt holders, but since the company filed for bankruptcy in Switzerland, the debt has been restructured.
If the US bought out Gazprom and became the owner of all of Gazprom’s shares, it would be the legal owner of the pipeline, but not of the gas that transits in it. Given that the US also controls LNG imports to Germany, the US, together with the Russian natural gas supplier, would control Germany’s natural gas. Norway’s share would be reduced, mostly because Russian gas is cheaper than Norway’s.
If a deal was made, the US owners would need to either build a new landing zone in Germany for the pipeline or buy out Germany’s current ownership of the landing areas and pipeline connections and make the landing zones (there are four of them) dual purpose. The current German government would almost certainly try and block such a deal.
Is Washington betting on a new German government more friendly to the US and Russia? If there is a shift in Germany it may be to a renewed CDU-CSU coalition with the SPD as the junior partner.
CDU is the Christian Democratic Union. Its leader, Friedrich Merz has been strongly opposed to Russian gas imports, but his policy of Russian-import substitutes has raised energy costs too high, hitting key industries including automobiles. The CSU is the Bavarian sister party to the CDU. It is somewhat more sympathetic to the possibility of Russian gas imports. Bavaria is Germany’s industrial powerhouse and hosts companies such as BMW, Audi, Siemens and Allianz.
One also cannot rule out the Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland or AfD) as a major future factor in Germany. The party, classified by the current government as “right wing extremist,” has experienced significant electoral gains, finishing second in the February 2025 federal election with 20.8% of the vote. The party is dominant in the now defunct east Germany (GDR areas) and doing well elsewhere. AfD opposes supporting the war in Ukraine and favors Russian natural gas imports.
The players
European news reports say the following are involved in the shadow negotiations surrounding Nord Stream 2:
Richard Grenell: Donald Trump’s former ambassador to Germany and special envoy is reported to have made several unofficial visits to Switzerland (specifically Steinhausen, where Nord Stream 2 AG is based) to discuss these possibilities. Grenell has officially denied involvement in such negotiations.
Matthias Warnig: The former managing director of Nord Stream 2 and a long-time associate of Vladimir Putin is also reportedly involved in drafting the outlines of a post-sanctions deal with Gazprom. Warnig started out as an East German (GDR) Stasi spy (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit) specializing in West German economics. He apparently worked with Vladimir Putin, then part of the KGB station in East Germany.
Stephen P. Lynch: A Republican donor and investment banker specializing in distressed assets, Lynch has sought permission from the U.S. government to purchase the pipeline, acting via his firm, Monte Valle Partners.
Lynch has sought to bring other figures into his initiative, including former U.S. Ambassador to Switzerland, Edward McMullen, and Texas investor Gentry Beach.
Outlook
To successfully negotiate a Ukraine deal, Washington needs to convince Russia such a deal is more beneficial than a military solution. Both sides are under significant pressure: Russia, because the cost of the war is zooming upwards, losses are becoming difficult to tolerate, and the national mood in Russia may be shifting against the Putin-led Special Military Operation in Ukraine.
It is also complicated for the US because Trump is seeking a deal on Ukraine to free his hand in the Pacific, which is a goal not shared by the Big Three in Europe. Europe’s top leaders suspect Trump is out to emasculate the NATO alliance and cast Europe adrift.
The Trump team will likely table a number of attractive economic ideas to get the Russians to move to a deal. The easiest is for the US to lift its sanctions on Russian oil and gas.
But aside from China and India (two big customers for Russian petroleum), Europe is the prize the Russians want. A Nord Stream deal would help that happen, but the hurdles are huge and the offer won’t mean much without a sea change in Europe’s policies and politics.
Stephen Bryen is a former US deputy under secretary of defense. This article, first published on his newsletter Weapons and Strategy, is republished with permission.
